Two Essays on Language and Conceptuality in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* / To Essay om Språk og Konseptualitet i Heideggers *Væren og Tid*

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Abstract

I discuss the role and place of language and conceptuality in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Over the course of two essays I try to show that language and conceptuality occupies a more significant role with respect to the framework of the text than is often assumed. In the first essay I discuss and interpret what it means for Rede to be “the existential ontological foundation of language”. I challenge established readings of Rede and argue that part of what it means is that experience, including perceptual experience, has linguistic form. The main body of the essay explicates what that amounts to. My reading has some interesting consequences. One of these is that instrumentalism and constitutionalism, two different conceptions of language, are rendered compatible. Usually these are thought to be mutually exclusive with respect to Being and Time. In the second essay I try to establish that the Heidegger of Being and Time is a conceptualist about perceptual content. I formulate this reading on top of rejecting a set of conceptions held by Taylor Carman (2003). I go on to argue that there is at least one sense in which it could be said that judging is not a derivative phenomenon, that we can distinguish between two ways for concepts to instantiate, and that there is a difference between intending a statement and intending by stating. The essays operate largely independent of each other, but their conclusion is similar: Language and conceptuality does not rest upon some pragmatically articulated meaning formulated in their absence. They reach “all the way down”.
Sammendrag

Acknowledgments

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Introduction

Thesis Description

Why Phenomenology? Perhaps because, in the recent words of Mark Okrent, “the best, indeed the only, way to understand what it is to be an entity of any given type is by understanding the conditions under which it is possible to intend entities as of that type.”¹ Phenomenology is a method for uncovering those conditions. Or at least that is what it was in the hands of Martin Heidegger. Okrent’s claim is strong. Heidegger’s is stronger: “Only as phenomenology is ontology possible.”² Or so he writes in the introduction to his seminal work Being and Time, a work largely concerned with uncovering the conditions under which it is possible to intend entities as being what they are. But, as anyone familiar with philosophy today is aware, Heidegger hasn’t been everyone’s cup of tea. Perhaps because of his propensity for strong claims, or the highly idiosyncratic language his phenomenology is cast in, or for darker reasons, turning on his affiliation with Germany’s National Socialist Party, Heidegger’s thought suffered a relatively late introduction into contemporary analytic philosophy. More than anyone Hubert Dreyfus was the person responsible for that introduction. He believed that there is a place for, indeed a need of, phenomenology in anglophone thought. In his 2005 APA presidential address he says: “Philosophers who want to understand knowledge and action can profit from a phenomenological analysis of the nonconceptual embodied coping skills we share with animals and infants.”³ As Dreyfus reads Heidegger, the primary type of entity we intend is to be understood in terms of pragmatic conditions as opposed to conceptual ones. As far as recent Heidegger scholarship goes, that aspect of Dreyfus reading seems to have stuck. Okrent is on board with it, so is Taylor Carman and Mark Wrathall, two of the most influential exponents of Heidegger’s thought in recent years. But I am not. I agree with Dreyfus that there is a need for phenomenology in contemporary analytic philosophy, but I think his own reading,

¹ Okrent 2017 p. 25
² BT p. 31/35 (Translation modified.) Unless otherwise stated I cite the Joan Stambough translation.
³ Dreyfus 2005 p. 47
with its followers, have left certain strands in Heidegger’s thinking a somewhat untapped resource. In my thesis I aim to get Heidegger off the strictly pragmatic leash by arguing that there are, in *Being and Time*, in addition to pragmatic conditions of possibility, conceptual and linguistic conditions of possibility. These conditions type entities equally primary, or so I believe.

*Thesis Structure*

The thesis is comprised of two substantial essays, each on a different moment in *Being and Time*. The essays are primarily exegetical in content, as opposed to phenomenological. However, phenomenological considerations that go beyond the text do figure in both. The reason for this is that in trying to settle exegetical disputes it becomes necessary to think with, as well as about, *Being and Time*. This is especially true due to the highly compressed nature of the text, which leaves, at times, much wanting. There is some overlap between the essays. For instance, the technical terms ‘fore-conception’, ‘circumspection’, and ‘significance’ figure in both. If a concept has been explained in the first essay and figures again in the second essay, I have chosen to explain it once more in accordance with what I am to say.

Both essays argue for a similar conclusion, that language on the one hand, and conceptuality on the other, have a “deeper” place in the framework of *Being and Time* than is assumed by many. In the first essay the emphasis is on language, in the latter it is on conceptuality. Language and conceptuality are obviously related. I distinguish between them only in the way *Being and Time* itself does.

The essays are structured similarly. Each begin by challenging what I take to be commonly held conceptions, proceed by arguing for an alternative, and end by taking stock of what has been gained. In both I offer, to my knowledge, novel interpretations of key passages.

The first essay begins by remarking on a problematic assumption shared by opposing parties in their interpretation of one of *Being and Time*’s a key terms Rede (often translated ‘discourse’). The main body of that essay consists in formulating and arguing for an interpretation of Rede that is made available after the assumption is discarded. In this I rely heavily on a distinction between *form* and *content*, so I attempt to make sense of those terms within the framework of *Being and Time*. I give two arguments in favor of
my interpretation. One of these is quite extensive and requires partial support from the second essay. That is the only direct link between the essays. The first essay, if convincing, demonstrates that there is a sense in which language (to *Being and Time*) could be said to conditions the ways in which beings are given to us in perceptual experience.

The second essay is in large parts an attempt to listen to a suggestion which Heidegger *seems* to make regarding the place of conceptuality in relation to our practical dealings with the world: That conceptuality is necessarily drawn on, in some sense, even in these practical dealings. That essay begins by arguing against an interpretative model that struggles to even entertain such a suggestion. Most of the essay is spent interpreting the section in *Being and Time* where concepts are treated (§33). In doing that I try to demonstrate that the text allows for two distinct ways in which concepts can instantiate. One of these is such that it can relate to practical dealings. That allows us to take Heidegger’s conceptualist suggestions seriously.
Heidegger first introduces Rede⁴ (Discourse) into the analytic of Being and Time as the “existential-ontological foundation of language”⁵. One would be hard-pressed to deny that Heidegger emphasizes language itself in explicating his conception of it. But the extent to which Heidegger intended to equate Rede with language remains a source of scholarly dispute.⁶ I will advance a reading of Rede which, to my knowledge, has yet to be fully pursued. I contend that the nature and implications of Rede remain obscured in large parts of the secondary literature due to the widely held presupposition that to qualify Rede in terms of language is to bind it to some notion of linguistic content – i.e. meaning, concept, or structure. Immediately, this gives rise to a concern that severe inconsistencies, if not flat out contradictions, are introduced in §§ 28-34, which, due to occupying a central position in the work, threatens to undermine the internal stability of Division 1. Hence the dispute. However, this presupposition is misleading, and we ought to let it go. Rather, the reading I advance here will attempt to work out the relationship between Rede and language in terms of a notion of form. In section one I spell out what I see as problematic and disjunctive aspects of the presupposition. In section two I say how it corruptions what is known as the ‘linguistic reading’ of Rede, which is otherwise OK in its emphasis on language and interesting with respect to the phenomena it answers to. In section three I explicate form and content with respect to the framework of Being and Time, and so distinguish my conception of Rede

⁴ I capitalize all transcendental terms. This goes for both essays.
⁵ BT p. 150/161
⁶ See Absher (2016) and Inkpin (2016) for summaries.
from the ‘bad’ kinds which I label disjunctive. In section four I argue in favor of my conception. I end by remarking on what we may gain by adopting the reading I recommend.

I

I’d like to begin with a remark on recent Heidegger scholarship. A common distinction in the literature since Guignon (1983) has it that Being and Time oscillates between a constitutive and instrumental conception of language (see the schema below). The former conception is encouraged by two claims. The first deals with Heidegger’s description of the existential condition of possibility for language, or Rede, as being on a level with and determining what Heidegger calls the fundamental structures of Disclosedness, conditions which necessarily shape the ways in which beings are given. The second has to do with manner in which he explicates and qualifies Rede with recourse to language itself. In support of the latter conception is a praxeological framework developed prior to the introduction of Rede, one interpretation of which, seemingly supported by further remarks, precludes any linguistically pervasive structure. These views are seen to be incompatible because they hinge on mutually exclusive ways of reading Rede. Since Carman (2003) these readings have been known as the linguistic and pragmatic models respectively. I take issue with this entire picture.

A Dogma in the Literature

Presently, commentators on Being and Time tend to operate with one distinction pertaining to an alleged conception of language found in the text (the instrumental/constitutive distinction), and another that work as an interpretive device for reading Rede, a term in the text (the linguistic/pragmatic distinction). That I have awarded the status of ‘interpretative device’ only to the linguistic/pragmatic distinction is important. If we were to construe the constitutive/instrumental distinction similarly, it would beckon us to attribute to Being and Time actual claims regarding the nature of language itself and (as I claim below) depending
on one’s interpretation of *Rede*, select some and exclude others. Though I acknowledge that the text in its scope and insight can tell for or against certain conceptions of language, it is vital to my purpose here that we dispense with definitive attributions. The below schematizations bring out the difference between the conceptions as I see them⁷:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conception of Language</th>
<th>Constitutive</th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutive</strong></td>
<td>Language shapes or conditions experience. What is experienced is determined in some sense in relationship to language.</td>
<td>Language is a means to represent facts that are themselves independent of language. To speak is to use linguistic items as a means to express one’s understanding of the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretative Device (way of reading <em>Rede</em>)</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
<th>Pragmatic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic</strong></td>
<td>“One’s understanding of the world is structured by an inherited symbolic or conceptual framework.” (Absher 2016)</td>
<td>“Individual speech acts are dependent on more fundamental practical comportments in the world and the practical understanding they presuppose, a primitive fount of know-how.” (Absher 2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is one sense in which the descriptions subsumed under the constitutive/instrumental distinction, as I have construed them, are not immediately incompatible. That language conditions experience does not necessarily count against the experience making available facts that are independent of language: things being so and such. What depends on language (what language conditions) may only be the way in which something is made available, so not necessarily what has been made available in that way: things being

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⁷ I quote from Absher 2016 p. 206. The schematization is mine. Absher considers both distinctions interpretive devices with regards to the way they are used in the literature. That is not incorrect, but it is unfortunate. The first distinction is formulated to avoid rendering it an interpretative device dependent upon one’s reading of *Rede*. 
so and such. In that sense, to claim that language conditions experience does not rule out the possibility of experiencing something does not depend on a linguistic meaning. We don’t then, *prima facie*, need to select between the conceptions. However, if we do submit *Rede* to the linguistic/pragmatic interpretative device, selectivity would be required of us. The tension between the pragmatic and the constitutive, and the linguistic and the instrumental, is straightforward. *Rede* cannot, due to its primordial character permit heterogenous ascriptions of the kind linguistic/non-linguistic pace its conceptual stability. If we are to see *Rede* as a fundamental structure of Disclosedness, we are thus required to rule out the compatibility between the instrumental and constitutive.

Since the linguistic/pragmatic distinction selectively compels us to choose between either the constitutive or the instrumental conception, applying it leads to what I call the *disjunctive conception of Rede*. It is my contention that this conception is warranted only by the illicit assumption that the extent to which *Rede* is connected to language is the extent to which it is to be qualified by some linguistic (or pre/proto-linguistic) *content*. That *Rede* is to be qualified with linguistic content is an idea that is affirmed by the linguistic reading. Conversely it is rejected by the pragmatic reading, but in the sense that a deep connection between *Rede* and language is rejected simultaneously. The unwarranted assumption understands the possibility of *Rede* and language being deeply connected to mean that *Rede* must itself be something like language (have linguistic content). I think there is a better way to understand the way *Rede* and language connects, thus the unwarranted assumption constitutes a target of the present essay.

What I say here may seem like a rather sweeping dismissal of a core tenet in otherwise excellent work by several scholars. But as I see it, the illicit assumption serves only as an unwarranted obstacle

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8 Other differences aside, among the pragmatically inclined we find Okrent (2003; 2017), Blattner (1999), Dreyfus (1991), Carman (2003) and Wrathall (2010). On the side of the linguistics there is: Guignon (1983), Lafont (2000) Dahlstrom (2013), Inkpin (2016), and Svec (2017). Some scholars do not fit so neatly into the division outlined but are nevertheless are in the hands of the disjunctive conception. Taylor Carman (2003) seem to advocate a view of *Rede* which could be labeled normative rather than linguistic or pragmatic. But the disjunctive conception can be understood in terms of the idea, *to be rejected or affirmed*, that *Rede* is bound to something linguistic where ‘linguistic’ is understood on some model of language-like content. Carman rejects that idea on such a model, and accordingly his normativism is of a pragmatic kind. Brandom Absher (2016) is interesting in that he does not fit the pragmatic/linguistic distinction, but nevertheless falls prey to the disjunctive conception. He rejects linguistic and pragmatic readings for reasons which I find quite right, but he extends this to a rejection of the
whose removal will allow us both to think more soberly about *Rede* itself, and lead us to appreciate the different and often very acute strains of thinking on language in the literature surrounding *Being and Time* as not necessarily inconsistent.

The above doesn’t pertain only to exegetical disputes extraneous to Heidegger’s own aims. The disjunctive conception of *Rede* is also the beating heart of a commonly acknowledged incoherence charge, levelled particularly at §§ 28-34, which, in being central to the existential analytic, threatens to challenge the internal consistency of the work as a whole. The idea here is that if Heidegger renders the connection between *Rede* and language (read, linguistic content), too intimate, he thereby introduces greater determinacy into the story (to borrow a phrase from Andrew Inkpin) than the story itself, as Heidegger tells it in those sections, should allow. The pragmatic reading works in part as a response to this incoherence. The linguistic readers are left with the admission that their interpretation, though correct, renders the text problematic unless further moves can be made.⁹

In short, there are multiple reasons to reject what I have called the disjunctive conception of *Rede*. The best way to do this is to offer a superior alternative, which is what I will attempt to do here. My conception of *Rede* distinguishes itself by understanding the relationship between Rede and language Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as methodology (BT §7). From this I get a linguistic constitutionalism which binds Rede to a notion of lingual *form* as opposed to content. In effect, I will

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⁹ Expressions of this include Gorner’s 2007 remark that Heidegger’s discussions of language are “confusing if not confused” (p.88) Dahlstrom’s 2013 admittance that his attempt to trace Heidegger’s concept of Rede leads to an “air of paradox not easily dispelled” (p.25) and Lafont’s critical reading of *Being and Time* as advocating an undesirable linguistic idealism (Lafont 2000). Of note is also Andrew Inkpin’s attempt to save the linguistic reading by claiming that *Rede* can bifurcate into forms corresponding to distinct modes of being Heidegger introduces; one less determinate than the other. Inkpin admits that this doesn’t completely secure coherence, since the bifurcation must be introduced at a level above the fundamental structures of Disclosedness. (See chapter 1 of his 2016).
argue that Rede has to do with an all pervasive linguaform Disclosure of the world. What that amounts to will emerge in due course.

II

I now turn to consider the kind of constitutionalism against which I differentiate my own. That means examining the linguistic reading in finer detail, taking note of their exegetical motivations. One may distinguish between two diverging strands, but they face the same problems. These problems are linked to the illicit assumption that when Heidegger qualifies *Rede* in terms of language it amounts to qualifying it in terms of linguistic content (concepts, structures, or meanings).

*The Linguistic Reading and its Challenges*

Except for a brief, though not insignificant, mention in §7, Heidegger doesn’t consider language in any detail until chapter five §§33-34, where *Rede* is introduced as the ontological condition of possibility for language. The chapter is titled *Being-in* and is where he introduces the primordial existentials of Disclosenedness (*Erschlossenheit*); the transcendence that structure and prefigure our every encounter with the world against which beings announce themselves and stand forth. The being of Da-sein, Heidegger’s term for the being which is human, is itself constituted by these structures:

“*[I am], means “I dwell”, I stay near […] the world as something familiar in such and such a way. Being as the infinitive of “I am”: that is, understood as an existential, means to dwell near …, to be familiar with. …Being-in is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Da-sein which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world”\(^\text{10}\)

In other words, Disclosenedness pertains to the *givenness* of the given\(^\text{11}\), the *ways* in which beings are individuated in the *there* of being-there (the *Da* of Da-sein). The existential structures of Disclosenedness,

\(^{10}\text{BT p. 51/55}\)

\(^{11}\text{It might be more correct to say ‘takenness’ in order to prevent the conception of a passive receptivity on behalf of Da-sein. For one, the ontology of Being and Time has it that seeing is a process where the given is taken to be such}\)
of which *Rede* is one, is ontologically constitutive of the ‘there’ of the world to which being-in refers. In Heidegger’s framework, the world belongs to Da-sein (whose essential constitution is called being-in-the-world) such that there is no world without Da-sein. The suggestive idealism in this statement is misleading. The position is that entities are given under conditions constitutive for their being, that they are accessed in ways that shape them. Their existence as parts of a reality independent of us humans do not depend on Da-sein, but their *being*, the ways they are shaped in being given, do. Chapter five deals with these ways.

As mentioned, scholars who opt for a linguistic reading greatly emphasize the role *Rede* plays in the disclosive framework in combination with the way *Rede* is linguistically spelled out. Heidegger equivocates between these features in §34 (Titled *Dasein and Discourse. Language*), which consequently has become a sort of ground zero for the present dispute. The first feature pertains largely to the positive characterizations Heidegger gives of *Rede*. It is comprised of the following four constitutive moments\(^{12}\):

- \((r1)\) That which is being talked about or referred to. (*das Woruber*);
- \((r2)\) What is said as such. (*das Gesagte als solches*);
- \((r3)\) Communication, the sharing of the world as disclosed. (*Mitteilung*); and
- \((r4)\) Intimation, what Da-sein reveals of itself in speaking. (*Bekundung*).\(^{13}\) A close connection between *Rede* and language is obviously suggested.

The plot thickens with the second feature, which is bound up with the definition of *Rede* as “the articulation of intelligibility (*Verstandlichkeit*)”,\(^{14}\) and eventually twists, for, as it turns out: “*Rede* equiprimordially determines Understanding and Attunement.”\(^{15}\) It is this move that drives the incoherence charge mentioned above. Attunement and Understanding make up equally fundamental (equiprimordial) structures of Disclosedness, and both have been treated prior to the introduction of *Rede* in ways that seems incompatible with the linguistic character *Rede* confers on them. Hence, Inkpin (2016)

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\(^{12}\) Whenever I refer to these I will use their respective numbers.

\(^{13}\) BT p. 151-2/162

\(^{14}\) ibid p. 150/161

\(^{15}\) ibid.
characterizes the twist as potentially problematic. As he sees it, chapter five reads as conferring upon the individuation of beings gradually higher levels of determinacy\textsuperscript{16} depending on the ways we encounter them. Briefly, these range from the manner in which the circumstances Da-sein has worked to find itself in is felt to matter to it, Da-seins Attuned sensitivity to the valence of possibilities it has realized, (§§29-30), and the co-occurring indeterminate, holistic, and purposive grasp offered by the Understanding of possibilities Da-sein are to realize (§§30-31), to the Interpretative seeing \textit{something as something} in terms of their relevance as equipment for carrying out some task at hand (§32), and eventually the determination of beings as objects of propositional statements (§33).

In this story, Understanding and Attunement already involves an intelligible grasp of the world. Yet in §34 Heidegger says that “intelligibility is \textit{always} articulated even before its appropriative interpretation.”\textsuperscript{17}, and as we just learned, \textit{Re}de is the articulation of intelligibility. In other words, \textit{Re}de is involved with Understanding and Attunement. At one point Heidegger even writes that Understanding and Attunement is determined by \textit{Re}de (BT: 126/133). Square that with the linguistic characterization of \textit{Re}de and it seems as the indeterminate grasp of Understanding is not so indeterminate after all. Especially (r1) and (r2) seem to concern the individuation of beings \textit{as} so and such, and in a manner reminiscent of propositional statements if anything\textsuperscript{18}. Yet it is in Interpretation, the \textit{development} of understanding that beings are determined \textit{as} something. How then can \textit{Re}de pertain to that which doesn’t even concern itself with beings \textit{as} beings yet? That, anyway, is Inkpins conundrum.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, since Understanding is a fundamental or primordial structure in the framework of \textit{Being and Time}, it underlies Heidegger’s initially non-linguistic explications of the concepts of ‘reference’, ‘signification’, and ‘intelligibility’ as they figure in his earlier characterizations of the Worldliness (or Worldhood) of the world. I return to these terms in section three and four. The question now is whether the world Da-sein finds itself in, and the beings encountered there, are more or less connected with language itself?

\textsuperscript{16} See the first chapter in Inkpin (2016) for his own exposition of this material.  
\textsuperscript{17} BT p. 150/161 (my emphasis).  
\textsuperscript{18} A point Taylor Carman stresses. See chapter 5 of his 2003.  
\textsuperscript{19} See Inkpin 2017 for his proposed solution.
Linguistic readers answer decisively in favor of more. They are motivated by accounting for the apparent pervasiveness of linguistic phenomena. After all there is a sense in which one could, colloquially, speak of language being everywhere in our lives. They also have a significant advantage over the pragmatic reading in that they can pay heed to the linguistic exposition of Rede in Heidegger’s text. Exegetically, they seem well placed compared to their opponents. But the pragmatic readers can challenge them on both accounts. They may claim that the linguistic pervasiveness this entails must give way to the fundamental praxeological framework developed by Heidegger in chapter three. Not only is this framework devoid of linguistic exposition, but Heidegger tells us that it founds “the possible being of words and language.” Second, they can argue that any reading that introduces incoherence into the system is uncharitable. Accordingly, the linguistic readers are faced with the challenge of accounting for Rede as a language-like primordial structure of Disclosedness in a way that makes sense with respect to the text as a whole. I will argue that the challenge cannot be met, but that this is not to vindicate the pragmatic reading.

Two Strands of the Linguistic Reading

In tying both features of Heidegger’s characterization of Rede together, the linguistic reader draws the implication that language in some way makes up or structures the Disclosedness of the world. Supposing the challenge presented above, we can distinguish between two strands of response.

Given its affinity with the language of the cognitive sciences I label the first the cognitive strand. It conceives of Rede in intellectualist terms. In its vain, Inkpin writes that we are: “encouraged to assume an underlying semantic structure common to both linguistic and non-linguistic acts that would presumably form a proper object of a theory of meaning.” Later he seems to suggest that such a role

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21 BT p. 82/86
22 Inkpin 2016  p.36
could be played by the “sublexical structure of an iteratively evolved sign system.” In less architectural terms, Barbara Fultner suggests reading Rede as a “living dynamic thing”, that taken on par with a conception of language as a toolbox which is constantly changing, bids her to suggest: “Neither [Rede] or language are static objects.”24 Such ascriptions render Rede conceivable in terms of occurrent material of some kind. This is, as we shall see, not innocuous. I suspect that conceiving Rede on the model of structures and materials may enjoy some of its appeal in light of Inkpin’s and Fultner’s aims, which is to put together a proper ontological basis for a philosophical theory of language. Both Fultner (2013) and Inkpin (2016) are quite explicit about their respective programs.25 Another figure that warrants mention here is Cristina Lafont. Arguing against the tenability of keeping Rede and language separate, her idea is that Rede renders intelligibility symbolically structured. She is notable for her highly idiosyncratic reading of Being and Time as a work of “de-transcendentalization”.26 This makes her take on these things the inverse of my own, which as we shall soon see, insists on getting the transcendence right. Because of this, she is also the one reader that demonstrates awareness of what I have termed ‘the unwarranted assumption’ – though if she is right it is quite warranted. Our differences span further than the confines of this text allow me to get into, however. But if I am right in what I say later on, it should count against the core of her thesis.

Where the first strand understands Rede in terms of structural or symbolic components, the second strand stress the linguistic/historical site of Da-sein. Charles Guignon is perhaps the most influential linguistic reader in this regard. He pictures language “not so much as a tool on hand for use as a medium in which man dwells.”27 For him, “to master the field of significance of a world (as opposed to, say, an animal’s dexterity in its natural environment) presupposes some prior mastery of the articulate structure of language.”28 On this picture, Rede locates Da-sein as the inhabitant of a landscape linguistically

23 Ibid p. 226
24 Fultner 2013 p.217
25 See the introduction to Inkpin’s Disclosing the World (2016) and the conclusion to Fultner (2013)
27 Guignon 1983 p.118
28 Ibid.
articulated such that familiarity with these articulations, taken over from a linguistic tradition, contribute both as conditions by which interpreting the world proceeds as well as the material of interpretation. That which is interpreted is meaningful, and so dwelling in the medium of language is to live in meanings. *Rede*, as the “publicly accessible realm of expressions of the intelligible world”\(^{29}\), harbors these meanings.

A recent development of Guignon’s position occurs in Švec (2017).\(^{30}\) Since this strand ties Rede to linguistic meanings, Švec wonders why Heidegger’ distinguishes Rede from language at all. His answer turns on the neatness of keeping language as a *totality of words* (echoing a manner in which Heidegger “ontically” characterizes language in §34) and the aforementioned ‘dwelling’ in the normativity of linguistic meanings, separate, together with a need to highlight “broader forms of language and expression than is usual in philosophy of language.”\(^{31}\) The way he expands on this point is telling:

> “[Rede] as intended by Heidegger encompasses not only words and their grammar, but also the whole range of ways in which we use language to communicate, including everything that we convey while sharing meaning, from tonality through rhythmic phrasing to gestures.”\(^{32}\)

The driving idea behind the ‘historical’ strand is that the understanding we have of ourselves, others and the world around us is bound up with us being historically situated creatures who have mastered language, its practices and customs. In turn, our understanding, being so bound, cannot be split up, as if to yield fine grained linguistic meanings apart from the stuff of coarse pragmatics. Given the definition of *Rede* as the determination of Understanding, the phenomenological underpinning of the idea is

\(^{29}\) ibid p. 116
\(^{30}\) This paper is notable for pitting Dreyfus and Okrent’s pragmatic proposals against a contrary emphasis upon the way linguistic phenomena pervade intelligibility. Švec writes “Since all our cultural and political institutions exercise their normative force upon us most notably through discursive practices, we might say that human existence is replete with linguistic meaning. To summarize, the practical signification disclosed in our project-oriented understanding cannot be considered at all as an autonomous substructure, upon which is grounded the superstructure of our existing within discourse and language.” (p. 215). In the conclusion I briefly suggest how we should think about pragmatic and linguistic togetherness.
\(^{31}\) Švec 2017 p. 16-17
\(^{32}\) ibid p.17
secured. But agree as we might with this idea, we should be unhappy with the manner the linguistic readers have *Rede* support it.

Transcendental Complications

As I see it, the methodological suppositions of the existential framework of *Being and Time* makes casting anything linguistically occurrent in the role of *Rede* difficult. Going with the historical strand, if *Rede* is to be conceived in terms of linguistic meanings – and/or spaces of such meanings, and/or some pre-given stock of linguistically meaningful possibilities – then, given *Rede*’s allegedly primordial character, we must conceive of these meanings etc. *ontologically* rather than *ontically* as Heidegger distinguishes between them. But I don’t think they fit the ontological bill.

The problem has to do with Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology as he lays it out in the introductory sections of *Being and Time*. After having secured Da-sein, the entity which understands its own being, as the entity which is to be interrogated about the meaning of being in general (§§ 3–4), Heidegger goes on to characterize the manner in which the interrogation is to proceed: The basic (ontological) structures of Da-sein must be worked out (§5). The question is how? Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology as a method (§7) answers that question. As methodology phenomenology has both negative and positive commitments. Negatively, phenomenology must access its object of investigation (Da-sein) without distortion, dogmatic constructions, or forcing upon it self-evident ideas detached from ontological consideration (BT p. 15/17). Since, as the introduction also makes clear, Da-sein understands its own being in terms of understanding the world, and the beings therein (BT p. 14/15), and this understanding is manifest in the ways in which things show themselves, as this pertains to the “common concept of phenomenon” (BT p. 27/31), we can formulate the negative condition as attempting to achieve access to phenomena, understood commonsensically, such that they aren’t predetermined by the theoretical or everyday conceptions we might have of them. Positively, phenomenology is to identify the a-priori constitutive conditions of these phenomena:
“What already shows itself in appearances prior to and always accompanying what we commonly understand as phenomena, though unthematically, can be brought thematically to self-showing. What thus shows itself in itself ("the forms of intuition") are the phenomena of phenomenology.”33

Heidegger quotes Kant’s difference between the transcendental a-priori conditions of possibility ("the forms of intuition"), and the objects of empirical intuition, because his conception of phenomenology involves a similar relationship. However, since he replaces the Kantian turn inwards to the categories of the human mind, with the Husserlian turn towards the things themselves as they are understood by, or show themselves to, Da-sein, his picture differs from Kant’s (and Husserl’s). Since Da-sein, in its "everydayness" (BT p.16/17), is characterized by existence, or as Heidegger calls it “being-in-the-world” the transcendental categories that constitutes its existence, aren’t like the “forms of intuition” which structure the Kantian mind. By introducing temporality (§6) at the heart of his investigation, and emphasizing Da-sein’s everyday ways of being, Heidegger understands the transcendental conditions of possibility existentially in terms that are bound up with time. He calls these conditions existential structures, and makes clear that they are not beings, but determinate for, or constitutive of, the character of the Being which is Da-sein (BT p.15/17). Since existence is temporal, and since being is not itself a being, these structures do not strictly pertain to ‘what’ something is; they do not pertain to “deeper” beings behind beings, but rather to how something is in its everyday ways of being.

We can now see what phenomenology as methodology aims at in its negative and positive characteristics. First, negatively, it must bring forward entities themselves “in the right way.” (BT p.32-3/37). Since being is always the being of some being, and Da-sein in its everydayness understands its own being in terms of the world and the beings therein, phenomenology must avoid distorting what is phenomenally given with preconceptions which doesn’t let beings show themselves as they normally do to that understanding. Second, and positively, it must, on that basis, identify the a-priory existential

33 BT p. 27-8/31
structures of being that accompanies these phenomena. Another way to put this is to say that Heidegger’s phenomenology proceeds by going through what is ontical– beings as we have phenomenal access to them in our ways of being (labeled existentiell) – and towards the ontological how of those beings, the ways in which they are.

The above warrants severe misgivings about the explication of Rede in terms of Švec’s broad linguistic phenomena. How could the positive result of a phenomenological inquiry – Rede – be identified with the negative result – something appearing linguistically meaningful. – from which the inquiry is to begin? To be clear, linguistic meanings may themselves have to do with how we are in the world. It is all right to say that something is given in terms of its being linguistically meaningful. But givenness, as transcendence, cannot itself be identified with linguistic meanings, nor, I think, a medium in which to dwell, or linguistic structure (whatever that entails). It might be correct, in some sense or from some point of view, to say that human beings occupy a position within a linguistic world or structure, but Rede cannot itself be this world or structure. Yet that is the constitutional sense in which Guignon and Švec interprets it. A general stock of linguistic meanings, or a semantic plane of immanence to dwell in, aren’t themselves capable of being transcendental ways in which something is given, for they fit only the mold of that which is given. To insist otherwise is to go against the methodology of first uncovering what is the case, before identifying the accompanying transcendental conditions, which brings with it the danger of de-temporalizing Heidegger’s schematization. If we were to mold a medium in which we dwell unto the phenomenological method of investigation, it would fit only what is in sight for the negative condition. The seeming strength of the linguistic reading lies in the heed it pays to Heidegger’s linguistic explication of Rede in terms of the positive characterizations (r1) to (r4) above. Yet, this strength appears as a weakness when the positive characterizations is cashed out in terms which do not cohere with Heidegger’s analytic.

This mistake repeats itself with the cognitive strand. It grafts into the transcendental stem something that ought not be there. It conceives the disclosive dimension of Rede on the model of a symbolic,
dynamic, or otherwise semantic structure. Nothing less than a reification of being, this failure to appreciate the ‘how’ is equally problematic: Whereas the historical strand emphasizes a space of semantic meaning suggestive of some extant immanence, the cognitive strand construes their talk about the ontological, the transcendental conditions for what is, in terms that denote what Heidegger would call the ontical, that which actually is. Instead of thinking being itself, the cognitive strand locates another kind of structural being at a level below the phenomenal.\textsuperscript{34} Again, maybe it could be said that we live within some symbolic or “sublexical” structure, but Rede as transcendence cannot be such a structure in the sense that speaking about that structure is speaking about Rede.

Where the cognitive strand in its emphasis on structures, conflates the ontical and the ontological, the historical strand, in its emphasis on meanings, conflates the existential and the existentiell. Existentiell has to with the possibilities Da-sein project itself into as it understands itself and the world. Existential has to do with the transcendental constitution of such possibilities. As I will get back to in section four, I happen to agree with the historical strand that there is a sense in which mastery of language allows for certain (existentiell) ways of being that permeate our lives.\textsuperscript{35} Perhaps this sense is enough to vindicate a form of constitutionalism even. But it is wrong to take this sense of constitutionalism for the constitutive transcendence that is Rede. Doing so would be tantamount to conceiving the existentiell ways of being that are caught up with language for their own existential condition, and that seems incoherent. Why this oversight?

To indulge briefly in diagnosis: Perhaps there is the worry that if one cannot bind the linguistic-historical realm up with some ‘language-like existential’, one has not ruled out a nonlinguistic core to which the hardheaded pragmatic reader could appeal. Pleading the linguistic environment as occupying an ontological structure is thought to account both for the linguistic emphasis Heidegger puts on Rede,

\textsuperscript{34} I suspect that this oversight is particularly tempting for someone that looks to either naturalize Heidegger’s analytic, or otherwise “salvage” its phenomenological insights without bothering with the transcendentalism it is wrapped up with.

\textsuperscript{35} For instance, though I won’t make too much of it here, I accept many of Guignon’s formulations. I take exception only to those that conceives Rede as a realm of expressions which harbor meanings.
and to count against those who think linguistic expressions must attach themselves to some prior pragmatically articulated meaningfulness. In denying a pragmatic underbelly to language, they locate language itself down below, as if that is what transcendence demands. The fault, of course, could be pinned on Heidegger. The linguistic reader, as noted, might concede that the result is problematic but claim to be respectful of the text. The pragmatic reader may devaluate the linguistic emphasis and maintain that it is better to secure the coherence of the program. Both, however, operate with the assumption that the constitutional issue turns on whether Heidegger qualifies Disclosedness with linguistic content (meanings, structures, expressions, concepts etc. all of which Heidegger would label ontic) They respectively seek to affirm or discard that claim, but I believe the basic assumption to be incorrect. I will spend the rest of this text unpacking and arguing for a conception of Rede that concerns linguistic form rather than linguistic content.

III

My tactics here has been to reveal and question what I have termed an unwarranted assumption. I will now try to formulate a coherent alternative. That involves making sense of a distinction between form and content in a strictly Heideggerian paradigm.

Displacing the “Tension”

The precedence set by Guignon’s (1983) comment on an alleged instrumental and constitutional tension in Being and Time should, as I have already indicated, leave us unhappy. Inkpin (2016 p. 36) suggests that the tension stems from Heidegger trying to balance two desiderata. The first is to make language

36 For all the attention I have put to the linguistic reading here, the pragmatist reading is loaded with issues itself. The best summary of these is found in Švec 2017. I will take on parts of the pragmatic reading in section four.
continuous with other meaningful activities, acquiring significance in much the same way hammers do. In this, Heidegger seeks to place language within the praxeological framework which make up the Worldliness of the world in a manner consistent with conceiving being-in-the-world as a unified phenomenon (Heidegger clearly conceives being-in-the-world that way. See §39). The second is to acknowledge that linguistic articulation has its own specificity, captured in the positive characterizations (r1)- (r4) he offers of Rede (being about, saying , communicating, and intimating something). Inkpin is right, I think, but in light of what I have already indicated, we cannot just leave it at that as if Heidegger’s aspiration here is the adequacy of some anthropological theory of the matter. Rather, the desiderata are of a kind; they adhere to his methodology as phenomena to be respected. That means getting at them in the right way – avoiding philosophical and common-sense bias – by letting them be what they are so that one may identify their a-priori accompanying phenomenological constitutive conditions. We ought to trace the tension back, not to differing conceptions of language, but to the case that language is phenomenally different, but not radically so, from other ways of making sense of things. That is also our clue to Rede, for thinking straight about it is a matter of not disregarding phenomenological lines of thinking.

I suggest that we ought to read Heidegger as seeing the intelligibility of linguistic expression as continuous with – i.e. not radically different from – praxeological intelligibility, and moreover, accordingly, that non-linguistic pragmatic sense has something in common with linguistic intelligibility to the extent that one could pass through the existentiell-ontical phenomena of language and towards the phenomenological structure of intelligibility as such. That is, I propose, Rede: a transcendental condition that secure that linguistic and non-linguistic intelligibility is similarly constituted, a shaping of intelligibility as such.

In §34 Heidegger takes note of the special kind of effort required to hear something like sensory noise. What is heard first and foremost is “the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, and the crackling fire”.

37 To my mind, he might as well have said that one hears what one might readily express as being

37 BT p.153/164
fires, winds, and woodpeckers. These things are heard, by way of determination, such that they are ‘suitable to constitute the content’\textsuperscript{38} of linguistic expressions. Beings are disclosed to be cast in roles that language assign them. In this sense, there are two sides to Rede. The first concerns the way the possibility of giving linguistic expression to one’s understanding shape the givenness of the surrounding world, whether one is discursively engaged in it or not. The second concern the actualization of such a possibility. The different sides tie up to each desideratum above, in which it is implicated by Heidegger’s treatment of Rede, or so I suggest, that the specificity of language, the actualized sense in which linguistic possibilities are taken up, transcends the content of linguistic expression and determines, as possibility, the unified structure of being-in-the-world. That is, being-in-the-world is permeated with language in the sense that everything encountered as intelligible is shaped by the possibility of giving expression to it. Consider something brought to my attention by Mark Wrathall: 2 years prior to the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger, in commenting upon Rede as his translation of the Greek term logos, asks us to consider “not the legein – discoursing and discussing, but rather the legomenon – what is said as such, what in each case is sayable and what is posited, the lekton.”\textsuperscript{39} Wrathall comments: “The Greek understanding of logos is not oriented to the words we say in discursive interaction, but rather the meaningful world that is capable of being talked about linguistically.”\textsuperscript{40} That the world is experienced as suitable to be put to words, as “in each case sayable” is to the point of Rede as I see it.

I read Rede to imply that Disclosure is linguaform: Disclosure is such that beings are disclosed as being suitable to constitute part of the content of a linguistic expression. With Rede, Heidegger is saying

\textsuperscript{38} Reworking a phrase borrowed from McDowell 2007. – ‘Suitable’ here, does not mean that there are specific words corresponding to everything. There is certainly that which we don’t have the words to express. But we still try, using perhaps the word “that”, as McDowell also emphasizes. Whatever the content of “that” is, it is content suitable to having been made content of the linguistic expression “that”.

\textsuperscript{39} Heidegger GA 21, as quoted in Wrathall 2010 p. 131

\textsuperscript{40} Wrathall 2010 p.131 – Wrathall, in spite of noting this, is not a constitutionalist. He rejects constitutionalism because Rede is not language, and so it would be wrong to say that language itself permeates Disclosure (see his “Discourse Language, Saying Showing”). But as I see it, Heidegger uncovers Rede as a primordial existential by looking at the way language relate to everything we intelligibly understand, noticing, among other things, the way what is given is encountered as suitable to figure as the content of expressions. I also disagree with Wrathall as to the correct manner in which to explicate Rede, but beyond giving my own account I won’t presently pursue our differences.
that Da-sein encounters entities partly in terms of being able to speak about them. In turn, given its positive characterizations (r1) to (r4), this means that the entities I encounter are given to me as ready to constitute the about which of sayings whereby they become determined as something for others from a point of view such that I reveal something of myself in the process. Importantly, this does not imply that we need to have words for everything, or that everything we see corresponds to the words we have. It is enough that we can address beings somehow in speaking, such as is the case when we talk about something we are not familiar with, or something which is difficult to express. That something will nevertheless constitute the “about which” of the expression; it will be suitable to figure as part of its content. This is a transcendental idea. It has to do with how beings are. They are friendly to language. Meanings, structures, or concepts are not required to flesh out the transcendence. Indeed, Heidegger does not flesh it out this way. He just proceeds, I suggest, in accordance with what his methodology reveals.

One may think that the insertion of a transcendental logos into perceptual experience warrant extensive treatment by itself, some story as to how language and experience go together, but if one never held something like language and seeing, or the conceptual and the pragmatic, apart at the outset, a story of how they merge is out of place.

If I am right, and Rede is best modelled on the idea of linguistic form (the givenness) rather than content (the given), perhaps we can relocate the tension noted by Guignon and Inkpin away from Heidegger’s text and into the minds of the readers that struggles to assimilate what they think must be distinct (perception and language/the pragmatic and the conceptual). This, however, might be a sort of philosopher’s distinction, the kind of theoretical prejudice that Heidegger’s phenomenological method seeks to avoid.

**Distinguishing between Form and Content**

My claim is that Rede has to do with the form of Disclosedness, not with the putative content of
expressions (or percepts) that bears that form. To certify that the distinction I propose is viable to the present material I seek to flesh it out in terms of a technical piece of the machinery in Being and Time. The following passage, which concerns the role of Rede, serve well in that regard.

“Discourse [Rede] is existentially equiprimordial with attunement and understanding. Intelligibility is also always already articulated before its appropriative interpretation. Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility. Thus, it already lies at the basis of interpretation and statement. We called what can be articulated in interpretation, and thus more primordially in speech, meaning. What is articulated in discoursing articulation as such, we call the totality of significations. This totality can be dissolved into significations. As what is articulated of what can be articulated, significations are always bound up with meaning.”

I will refer to this simply as ‘the passage’. In it, we are treated to no less than three technical terms, ‘intelligibility’ (Verstandlichkeit), ‘meaning’ (Sinn), and ‘totality of significations’ (Bedeutungsganze), all articulated by Rede. Though it is not immediately obvious that the terms do not collapse into each other, mapping some relations between them contribute to the kind of situating of form and content that I have in mind.

To understand all the terms above it must be made clear that Da-sein always understands itself in terms of possible ways for it to be. Possibility here, is an existential, and is “the most primordial and the

41 Something like this might be familiar as the position of John McDowell, who makes the case that conceptual capacities are actualized in perception. However, McDowell’s first formulation of that claim, spelled out in Mind and World, understood ‘actualization’ in terms of a propositional character of seeing which would take concepts as constituents. That position cannot be readily assimilated to the present once since Rede is not coextensive with language or conceptuality. McDowell has subsequently moved away that way of putting things, adopting instead a Kantian account (see his 2008). It would be natural to think that we could draw on differences between Kant and Heidegger to assess the compatibility between Heidegger and McDowell, but the degree to which McDowell’s position truly is Kantian, rather than, say, one that extends a Kantian insight to himself while divorcing it from Kant’s general concerns, has been a matter of debate. My suspicion is that McDowell’s overarching concern, that rationality figures directly in sensory consciousness, is kept well and warm under Heidegger’s existential transcendental conception of logos (Rede).

42 “Das in der redenden Artikulation Gegliederte als solches nennen wir das Bedeutungsganze.”

43 BT p. 150-1/160 (Both discourse and speech refer to Rede.)

44 Gregory (2016) for instance seem to think that Sense and Significance amount to much of the same. Perhaps this wouldn’t be entirely pernicious given that we can see them as corresponding to different constitutive dimensions of a unified phenomenon, being-in-the-world, whose unification is temporarily dispensed with at this point in Heidegger’s analysis. But that is not the tactic I run with here.
ultimate positive ontological determination of Da-sein”.

Heidegger thus characterizes Da-sein as “thrown”, as always underway realizing some possible way for it to be in terms of which it understands both itself and the world. (BT: 135/144). Imagine attending a fine, though perhaps a little stiff, dinner. A friend seated across the table asks you to pass her the boiled carrots. Her voice, usually lively, is now calm and restrained. In understanding her request the bowl of carrots come to be determined in a way which accords with a possibility you can realize. Projecting into that possibility means to pass over the boiled carrots in a certain way that accords with the tone of the request and the state of the company. At the same time, the bowl of carrots, as a being within the world comes to be “freed for its own possibility of being” it gets determined as something to be passed over the table while being handled with refinement. In this case, both the manner in which you projected yourself into a possible way of being opened for by the request, and the way in which a being was freed in terms of its own possibility, correspond to the fact that you understand yourself in terms of the present circumstances as someone attending a formal party (a possible way for someone to be). The possibilities one realizes, or presses into as ways of being, is nested into other possibilities which Da-sein understands itself in terms of. Passing the boiled carrots, and passing them like this or that, is part of what it is, on Heidegger’s picture, for you to understand yourself in a certain way of being. Since this picture applies generally to Da-sein as such, Da-sein is being-possible.

That Da-sein is being-possible, means that Possibility isn’t itself something explicitly grasped as such: “Such a grasp precisely takes its character of possibility away […], it degrades it to the level of a given, intended content.” Heidegger ties Possibility to the project character of the Understanding, which is the existential structure constitutive of Da-seins being-possible. Heidegger writes that the project projects Da-sein upon its “for-the-sake-of-which just as primordially as upon significance as the worldliness of its actual world.” For now, it is enough to say that Significance (tor the totality of

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45 BT p. 135/144
46 ibid.
47 ibid p. 136/145
48 ibid.
significations) is the *connectivity* between entities, practices, and goals, while the for-the-sake-of-which is that which sustains it. That is why Da-sein is projected just as primordially upon both. We saw this in the example above, where the bowl (an entity) was brought to attention as something to be passed over in a certain way (a practice) *for-the-sake-of* being suitable company as was called for by the circumstances (the goal).49 Further, since the relations that make up Significance constitute the Worldliness of the world, Understanding is always understanding of the world. The world is understood in terms of the projection.

Interpretation (*Auslegung*) is the existential development of Understanding; “the development of the possibilities the understanding projects.”50 Since Understanding is always understanding of the world, Interpretation is Interpretation of the world. Heidegger says that in Interpretation Understanding becomes itself, appropriating what it has understood (BT: 139/148). Interpretation is the understanding, or seeing, of something *as something*, an entity ‘as’ being so and such (the bowl as being passable). In interpreting entities, Interpretation always presupposes something of what it Interprets. Heidegger calls this presupposition the *fore-structure* of Understanding. Being already, in advance, familiar with the ways in which knives, forks, and plates, carrots and edibles etc. are related in their respective possibilities, and having already, in advance, a conception as of what it means for a dinner to be “fine”, matter, to understanding (the determination of) the carrots *as* being passable like this or that. The relationship between the fore-structure and the Interpretation then is that the latter develops possibilities, seeing beings in their possibilities (*‘as’*), in terms of the former.

Heidegger doesn’t say that the fore-structures structure Interpretation, only that Interpretation operates “within them” as based on what is already (in advance) understood. (BT: 142/152). What then, does the fore-structures structure? The answer is Meaning (*Sinn*). Meaning, in turn, is the *upon which of*

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49 Heidegger distinguishes between a for-what and for-the-sake-of-which (BT p. 81/87). The former is really a secondary case of the latter. The primary kind of the latter is really Da-seins ultimate care for its own being. The primary for-the-sake-of-which in this case might then really be something like “not being disliked by the proximal social group”, or “remaining eligible for a promotion to ensure economic safety”.

50 BT p. 139/148
the project. It is difficult to understand exactly what Heidegger has in mind here. Given what we have already learned, it seems like he is saying that Meaning is to be equated with Possibility, for he does say that Meaning, like Possibility, is an existential, that the project projects upon both (the-fore-the-sake-of-which is a possible way of being, and Significance is constituted by beings freed in their possibilities\(^{51}\)), and that only Da-sein (which is being-possible) can be meaningful. If this is the case, we could say that what is Disclosed in terms of possibilities is, by virtue of that fact, Meaningful.

Yet, it doesn’t matter for my purposes exactly how we make sense of this. What matters is that Meaning is “that wherein the intelligibility (Verstandlichkeit) of something maintains itself.”\(^{52}\) Recall Heidegger saying that Meaning is articulated in Rede more primordially than in Interpretation. Since this ‘primordially’ pertains to Rede’s equiprimordiality with Understanding (and Rede, if we recall, determines understanding) it seems right to assume that Meaning, as the upon which of the project, should be articulated in Interpretation in conformity with the way already articulated by Rede at the level of Understanding. We can see that this occurs in a manner that seems in tune with my reading of Rede if we look at the fore-structure called fore-conception (Vorgriff), which characterizes the way beings are Interpreted ‘as’ something in terms of having been conceptualized in advance.\(^{53}\) The idea I propose is that Meaning is linguaform. What is linguaform is capable of being put to words. Since the Intelligibility of something maintains itself in something that bears that form – such that only under that form is

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\(^{51}\) “Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance, but innerworldy beings themselves are freed, these beings are freed for their own possibilities” (BT p. 135/145).

\(^{52}\) BT p. 142/151. - This also makes sense with respect to identifying Meaning and Possibility, given that as we have seen, something is Interpreted as something in terms of its possibilities; ‘as’ being passable etc.

\(^{53}\) There are scholars who fails to acknowledge that fore-conception implies “conceptualized”. My second essay exposes and contests a chief reason for this. I say “fails” because I find the textual evidence to be quite decisive. Heidegger says that Interpretation can draw/force conceptuality from/unto beings, and that Interpretation “settles upon a definite conceptuality”. (BT: 41/150). He also says that Interpretation can guarantee a scientific theme if it refuses to let the fore-structural grasp in advance “be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions”, and rather develops “these in terms of the things themselves.” (BT: 143/153), which seems hard to interpret if conceptuality is not intimately involved with it. Finally, he says that the fore-conception contained in a statement “remains mostly inconspicuous since Language already contains a developed set of concepts” (BT: 147/157). This clearly indicates some relationship between concepts and the fore-conception.
something intelligible as so and such – Interpretation, in developing some understood possibility, can utilize conceptuality to do so.

I have tried to make the distinction between form and content viable within Heidegger’s framework of Disclosedness: Form pertains to that which sustains intelligibility, content to that which is intelligible ‘as’ something. We can use this to make sense of the equivocation in §34 where the term *Rede* sometimes denote an existential structure and sometimes the act of speaking. Indeed, this is what motivated the linguistic reading. It bears keeping in mind however, that Heidegger uses ‘*Rede*’ (speech), when he indicates the existential structure, and ‘*reden*’ or ‘*redenden*’ (to speak/speaking), when he refers to the act. These terms refer to each other, no doubt. Indeed, he says that *Rede* gets expressed in language (BT: 151/161). But when Heidegger in ‘the passage’ refers to the discoursing articulation of the totality of significations, he uses ‘*redenden*’ and seems to refer to the act of speaking as such. What is the relationship between Meaning (*Sinn*) and Significance (the totality of significations) with respect to the articulating function?

Heidegger says that what is understood (what is intelligible) is not “strictly speaking” a meaning, but a being, (BT: 142/152), and that beings, are “freed” for their own possibilities (capable of becoming intelligible ‘as’ something), by disclosing the world as Significance (BT: 135/144). In other words, the beings sustained as intelligible in Meaning, are made available to be intelligible by Significance. This, as we have seen, implies that the beings, for instance the bowl of carrots, freed in its possibility of being passable, is articulated by *Rede*. When, in the example I used, one was asked to pass the bowl of carrots, the being of the bowl (the about which) was determined in accordance its possibility of being passable (the something said), for you by someone else (the shared), in a way that accords with the other persons understanding which is simultaneously made available (intimation); the calm refinement evident in the voice asking indicates the shared project of attending a fine dinner, what opens for the possibility of passing the bowl in an according way. This, I take it, is an example of “discoursing (*redenden*) articulation as such”.

Notice that what gets expressed in the discoursing articulation is not just beings, but Significance: the referential relations between beings, (carrots and people), practices (passing and eating), and goals in terms of which one understands oneself (being refined company). In ‘the passage’ we learn that this whole can be “dissolved” into significations (*Bedeutungen*): ‘Carrot’, ‘Bowl’ ‘Edible’, ‘Asking’ ‘Passing’, ‘Guest’, ‘Cultivated’, etc. and earlier (BT: 82/88) that these found the possible being of words and language (a point stressed by the pragmatic readers). The passage concludes: “As what is articulated of what can be articulated, significations are always bound up with meaning”. We can now see why: Signification, as “dissolved” Significance, pertains to the being which is “freed” to be intelligible, and that which is intelligible is sustained in Meaning. Meaning, moreover is articulated by * Rede*, which on my proposal meant that whatever is intelligible (i.e. significations) is suitable to become (part of) the content of linguistic expression. Understood existentially, discoursing (*redenden*) articulation, means expressing significations linguistically in accordance with their linguaform intelligibility. Since significations is “dissolved” Significance, this really is to express Significance itself. That §34 addresses *Rede* as both a fundamental existential of Disclosure and characterizes it in terms of (r1) to (r4), should now make sense. Significance pertains to the Worldliness of the world. When significations are put to words; when the possibility of expressing significations in language is realized – and the point of saying that *Rede* is linguaform Disclosure is that it is the condition for this possibility –, something is said (r1) about something (r2) such that the world as it is understood is shared (r3), which accordingly makes someone’s specific understanding available, as intimated (r4).

The relationship between Significance and Meaning is such that the former frees beings in their possibilities, and the latter, being articulated by *Rede* (to which corresponds its existential ontological signification), sustains these so that when the beings, being freed, is put to words, the former too gets

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54 Being significations none of these beings are strictly speaking subject-things. The signification ‘Carrot’ for instance, is not CARROT as that which could be represented symbolically as an item in a proposition. ‘Carrot’ in the present example is the for-what (*Dazu*) of being eaten. ‘Bowl’ is the in-order-to (*Um-zu*) be passed along etc. Language can nevertheless articulate these significations. This, as I see it, entails a different way of looking at what it means for something to be the subject of a sentence.
articulated by Rede (to which corresponds the linguistic characterization). I have tried to apply the distinction between form and content to Heidegger’s framework in order to show how we can make sense of the linguistic characterizations of Rede in transcendental terms. In doing so there has been no need to cash out Rede in terms of linguistic meanings, concepts, or some language-like structure. This is nevertheless not a pragmatic approach since it rejects that linguistic significations are founded upon non-linguistic significations. If something is a signification it is significant as something suitable to be linguistically addressed; it is not to be conceived at a distance from language somehow.

IV

Having presented an alternative to what I consider flawed conceptions of Rede, I’ll continue by arguing on independent grounds for the plausibility of my own reading.

Meeting a challenge from intent

Heidegger is not interested in providing an exhaustive account of the anthropology of Da-sein. (BT: 124/132). The existentials his analysis uncovers are by his own admission those in service of his general project, which at the time of Being and Time was preparing the task of properly asking the question of the meaning of being. With that in mind we should, confused as we appear to be about the nature of Rede ask why Rede is considered as a fundamental existential on par with Attunement and Understanding? Given that Heidegger himself addresses this, we might as well start there.

55 The density of all this is no accident. With terms like Meaning and Significance Heidegger is breaking into different constitutive moments what is really a unified phenomenon (being-in-the-world) to examine these individually. In that sense, what I am doing here is like sowing together what is not really apart.
Readers who look to the sections that addresses propositions and expressions (§33 and §34), in hope of finding an illuminating and cohesive philosophy of language will be disappointed. Well aware of this, Heidegger ends these sections with both a general remark: “Philosophical research will have to give up the task of ‘linguistics’ if it is to ask about the ‘things themselves’ and attain the status of a problematic that has been clarified conceptually,” and a specific one:

“The foregoing interpretation of language has the sole function of pointing out the ontological “place” for this phenomenon in the constitution of being of Da-sein and above all preparing the way for the following analysis in which taking as our guideline a fundamental kind of being belonging to Rede, in connection with other phenomena, we shall try to bring the everydayness of Da-sein into view in a way that is ontologically more primordial.”

Here, we learn that Heidegger is not concerned with language in its own right, and that his concern has been about securing the ontological “place” for the phenomenon of language – what we have been dealing with in discussing Rede – in preparing for the remainder of the text. A challenge facing the competing readings of Rede, then, is to render these readings relevant, if not crucial, for Heidegger’s “following analysis”. This could be understood either as the immediately following analysis of Rede’s fallen variant, Gerede (idle talk), or generally as the remainder of the text, Division II. But given that Division II trade largely on the Authentic way of being for Da-sein as opposed to the Inauthentic everyday kind, and the distinction between Rede and Gerede mirrors this, perhaps it doesn’t matter. In any case, I am uncertain whether this is a challenge the pragmatic reading considers at all (I have yet to see it addressed), due to their strong emphasis on Heidegger’s early discussion of equipment and practice, and I suspect that the linguistic reading, if we allow it to get even this far, may struggle since subscribers have a tendency to render the constitutional function of Rede intelligible terms of Heidegger’s

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56 Heidegger’s sections on language in Being and Time is frequently commented upon as unsatisfactory, but that incites a contentious demand that he should be bothered with it at all. Still, I am in all this motivated by the belief that we can extract interesting implications from Heidegger’s thinking on language.
57 BT p. 156/166
58 ibid.
subsequent characterizations of *Gerede*, thus standing in danger of collapsing the two. I leave it to them to figure it out. Here, I want to make it clear that my own reading is perfectly capable of meeting that challenge. This is because it can clarify the relationship between *Rede* and *Gerede* such that it makes it evident why they should be kept apart while giving the appropriate answer as to how.

I claimed that *Rede* allows for the constitutive structure of Interpretation called fore-conception (*Vorgriff*). Heidegger writes: “What is disclosed in understanding, what is understood is always already accessible in such a way that in it its ‘as what’ can be explicitly delineated.” Fore-conception pertains to the part of this explicit delineation, or determination, which trades on conceptuality (*Begrifflichkeit*). My earlier point was that Understanding works itself out in Interpretation by drawing on a conceptual grasp of the world. Heidegger writes:

“[I]nterpretation can draw the conceptuality belonging to the beings to be interpreted from these themselves or else force them into concepts to which beings are opposed in accordance with their kind of being.”

On my reading, the quote yields a picture whereby *Rede* determines Understanding (BT:126/133) such that what is understood is worked out in Interpretation (the development of Understanding) partially in terms of the conceptual grasp one enjoys of the circumstances. This is not because Disclosure can be framed in terms of conceptual content, but because what is disclosed is such that it is suitable to be grasped conceptually. *Gerede* trades on this fact by letting beings be determined by the conceptual grasp which belongs to what is normally said of them. In his discussion of *Gerede* (§35), Heidegger analyzes the phenomenology that corresponds to this sort of determination. His discussion is thus set up by his explication of *Rede* in §34 in terms of the about which (r1) and the something said (r2). In other

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59 This tendency can be found both in Guignon (1983) and Svec (2017), and to a lesser extent in Dahlstrøm (2012).
60 BT 139-40/149
61 This point must escape the pragmatic readers which are forced to come up with ways of reading fore-conception that dislodges it from a conceptual grasp. I discuss Taylor Carman in that regard in the second essay.
62 BT p. 141/150
63 Hirsch (1975) points out the German prefix ge indicates a gathering together of several elements, taking this to mean that Ge-rede indicates a collection of many words (thus emphasizing the said as such).
words, *Rede* discloses beings such that they can be determined by that which it is said of them, allowing for the inauthentic disclosure which is *Gerede*. When this occurs, beings are forced into concepts to which they “are opposed in accordance with their kind of being.” However, *Rede*, on my reading, also sediments the possibility of authentic understanding by making room for the possibility that the conceptuality belonging to the beings can be drawn from these themselves. Something is still said of them, but that which is said is said in accordance with them.

As I see it, *Rede*’s disclosive function is allowance of self-showing in words. Heidegger locates this possibility in ‘Hearing’ which he deems “the primary and authentic openness of Da-sein”, and “an existential possibility which belongs to Rede itself”⁶⁴. *Rede* does this by letting beings, as the about which of the said, be. In Hearing, Da-sein overrides the tendency to draw its conception of something from that which is being said of it, instead letting the about-which, as it were, speak for itself. If one can, and this might at times be a matter of skill (such as the skill of a poet), one may then draw the appropriate words from them. But this could not be if the given wouldn’t be the sort of thing one could draw words from. I don’t see how the possibility of putting authentic Understanding into words, which Heidegger seems to open for, can be made sense of, unless the givenness of beings is such that makes room for this; unless the given is suitable to figure as the content of expressions.

*Being and Time* was meant as a preparation for answering the introductory question of the meaning of being. (BT: 15/17). To this effect, the first and second division respectively investigates what inauthentic and authentic understanding of being consists in. Heidegger’s discussion of *Rede*, going some way to make the relationship between the two modes of understanding intelligible, figures as a decisive step in this direction. It seems to me that understanding *Rede* as linguaform disclosure of beings, in the way outlined, is perfectly in accordance with the “following analysis” in that it accommodates a relationship between authentic and inauthentic understanding which is appropriate to that analysis.

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⁶⁴ BT p.153/164
All parties agree that the capacity to speak is a possibility conditioned for by Rede. The disagreement turns on how to make sense of Rede as being equiprimordial with Attunement and Understanding. My view originates with the phenomenological insight that we can put the world to words in certain ways. But perhaps we can, within the framework of Being and Time, move in the opposite direction, from a capacity for speech to the specific conception of disclosure that I recommend. I shall try to carry out such a move in terms of an analogy between language and Heidegger’s treatment of equipment.

Consider in broad strokes how the primordial structures of Disclosedness is situated in the text: After a preliminary sketch of the subject matter, Heidegger’s aim in chapter three is the exposition of the existential structure of the Worldliness of the world by recourse to an analysis of the being of equipment that we typically encounter in everyday circumstances, and to contrapose this with the traditional Cartesian conception of the world as res extensa. In chapter four, he renders Worldliness intelligible as shared, simultaneously introducing his conception of ‘the They’ (das Man). Chapter five, in turn, works to reveal the deeper structural constitution of what has already been exposed. Yet we find a remarkable difference, for whereas the treatment of Attunement and Understanding harkens back to earlier descriptions of taking-care, relevance and equipment, and Gerede rehearses the theme of the They, Rede and language is introduced at a single stroke leaving the relationship between language and Worldliness ambiguous. Though we learn that the transcendental conditions for language go deep, we lack any analysis of the being of language corresponding to that of equipment. Nevertheless, there are obvious similarities between them that can prompt us to think about the former in a way that resembles the latter.

Heidegger analyzes the being of equipment by considering the structure of signs, which he deems capable of being “formalized to a universal kind of relation so that the sign structure itself yields an ontological guideline for ‘characterizing’ any being whatsoever.” The genuine encounter with a sign is not that of having some-thing before oneself to inspect, but the “acquisition of an orientation within one’s

65 Heidegger is explicit about this move. See BT p. 50/54
66 BT p. 72/77
surroundings” in which the sign itself withdraws in favor of bringing “the actual aroundness of the surrounding world into an explicit ‘overview’” Heidegger calls this circumspective seeing. In such seeing beings refer to other beings. The familiar example is the hammer that in being used (successfully) retreats, as it were, to appropriately present the nail and board in light of the task of building. The givenness of circumspective seeing is constrained by pragmatic value such that the perceptual given is intrinsically structured by purposeful activity. From this, Heidegger establishes that the being of the world (Worldliness) is constituted by a net of referential relationships among beings and practices in their relevance to Da-sein (as we have seen he calls it Significance). In chapter five he will utilize this analysis to secure the existential structure of Understanding. Understanding is constitutive of Significance as what discloses the world “in its possible significance”.

Compare with language. The given in perception is a function of the sign structure of equipment. What is the given in language a function of? Heidegger never addresses language in detail, so it is as if this part of the story is cut short. But perhaps not; perhaps Heidegger thought that the previous exposition of Significance was sufficient, for his purposes, to account for the linguistically given. It is just that in chapter five, with Rede, he tells us something more about what Significance pertains to than what is evident in chapter three and four.

In a widely commented upon passage, Heidegger writes:

“But the significance itself with which Da-sein is always already familiar contains the ontological condition of the possibility that Da-sein, understanding and interpreting, can disclose something akin to “significations” which in turn found the possible being of words and language.”

The suggestion here is that language requires a pragmatically disclosed web of Significance to get going. I have no qualms with this. But the pragmatic reading of the passage is stronger. Since Heidegger explicates this web in terms of equipment and equipmental relations, this reading suggests that language

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67 BT p. 74/79
68 BT p. 135/144
69 BT p. 82/86
is simultaneously parasitic upon the meaning involved in the use of equipment in the practical contexts in which we live, such as the meaningfulness of hammering in the context of building a house to live in.\textsuperscript{70} That Heidegger’s discussion of Significance aims to expose our primary way of dealing with the world is also suggestive in this regard, for he has yet to introduce any linguistic considerations at this point. (A remarkable fact about Division I is that a wealth of terms and concepts often associated with language, such as sign, reference, intelligibility and signification, are first introduced in a context devoid of linguistic considerations). Ultimately however, displacing his later linguistic considerations in favor of a previous exposition may skew the picture that eventually emerge. I will try to show why.

First, bear in mind that Worldliness (or Significance) is constituted by Reference, and Reference is not “the ontic specification of equipment, since it, after all, constitutes equipment itself”.\textsuperscript{71} The pragmatic interpretation may be premature if Heidegger, at the end of chapter three, has yet to tell us all he has to say about Significance. We have already seen that the totality-of-significations is discursively articulated. I believe, in line with my previous interpretation of this, that significations found the possible being of language, or as he puts it elsewhere, that “words accrue to significations”,\textsuperscript{72} because significations are linguaform, hence suitable to be linguistically expressed. That means that there is nothing to distance non-linguistic significations from linguistic expressions, and therefore that linguistic significations are on a level with non-linguistic significations. That also means that both are characterized equally by Reference. If that is the case, Significance is not bound to a non-linguistic pragmatic totality. That something is suitable to be linguistically expressed means, in part, that it stays what it is, when linguistically addressed\textsuperscript{73}. That, of course, does not mean that saying you hit your thumb with the

\textsuperscript{70} The most influential account of this is found in Dreyfus (1991). For a recent exposition see Okrent (2017). Okrent thinks it is possible for there to be a group of social animals that count as Da-sein “even though these animals entirely lack the ability to speak, make assertions, or intend entities as vorhanden.” (2017 p. 27). For the most influential

\textsuperscript{71} BT p. 77/83

\textsuperscript{72} BT p. 151/161

\textsuperscript{73} I am not committed to thinking that it stays exactly what it is when heard. Two people experiencing the same event while talking about it does refer to the same event in talking, but the event they witness may be witnessed differently by both. Their individual expressions of the event refer to the event as it is revealed to each respectively.
hammer is the same thing as hitting your thumb with the hammer, only that having done so figures as the “about which” of the expression.

Next, it is important for me that I don’t need to assume my own conception of Rede to cash out the idea that linguistic and non-linguistic significations are on a referential level. Consider the case where Martin has hit his thumb with the hammer and says so. The utterance is intelligible to Adrian by reference to a host of things; the practice of hammering; Martin’s incapacity to go on hammering; Adrian being required to take over the hammering; Adrian’s understanding of himself as someone who ought to help out when Martin is in pain; Adrian’s own hammer, etc. Martin’s expression may thus come to signify a conception of friendship. In turn that conception signifies Adrian’s own hammer which he picks up to help out. The point of the case, which doesn’t seem to be out of the ordinary, is that the practical dealings with equipment can involve reference to linguistic expressions and conceptions, and vice versa.

I am uncertain whether the pragmatic reading, at least in the guise I am considering, can allow Adrian’s conception of friendship to enter into Significance in this way. After all, ‘friendship’ is a concept and should thus, to this pragmatic reader, trade on pragmatic meanings that underpin it. Yet, in this instance it doesn’t arrive on top of a set of pragmatic meanings, it occupies a place among practices, within the referential structure of Significance itself. If that is the case, the pragmatic reading of the matter is less than compulsive, for it draws its non-linguistic conclusions on the assumption that the signifying, or referential, relations which characterizes Significance is exclusively bound up with the sign-structure of equipment as opposed to concepts. But such a conclusion cannot be derived solely from chapter three exposing the sign-structure by considering the being of equipment. In fact, if we accept that linguistic expressions or items can enter into signifying relations, we seem to be compelled to think otherwise. If we do that however, my conception of linguaform disclosure looks to follow. Here’s the argument:
P1  If something circumspectively orients us beings are given in accordance with that orientation. (When Hammers, in use, circumspectively orients us towards nails, the nails are given in terms of the hammer; the hammer withdraws to present the nail).

P2  Linguistic expressions circumspectively orients us.

P3  It is always possible for Da-sein to express itself linguistically (it can speak to itself if no-one else, though it may not actualize this possibility). Speech is always a possibility.

P4  Possibility shapes the how of determination (or givenness).

C1  (From P1 and P2) Beings can be circumspectively given in accordance with linguistic expressions.

C2  (From C1, P3 and P4) Beings are given such that it is always possible to determine them circumspectively in accordance with linguistic expressions.

The conclusion entails the way I explicated the idea of linguaform Disclosure in section 2. If signifying something circumspectively does not preclude, by that fact, signifying something linguistically, then circumspective seeing is not radically opposed to linguistic seeing. This in turn makes circumspective seeing available to be shaped by the kind of possibility that belongs to speech, making that which is seen present in a form such that what is seen can be linguistically expressed (a form such that it is suitable to figure as the content of a linguistic expression).

Let’s consider the premises. The first premise just assumes circumspective seeing, so it should be relatively unproblematic. It is there to ensure that what is ordinarily is given in accordance with something else. The second premise makes sure that this something else can be linguistic. It is the kind of phenomenal case stressed by the linguistic readers, and one which I tried to bring out as perfectly ordinary with respect to Adrian and Martin. If one wishes to challenge the second premise, as I imagine

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74 Expressed, or otherwise explicated. As I already said, it is mysterious how something could be determined in accordance with a fore-conception if this was not the case.
pragmatic readers might want, one ought to either find something in Heidegger’s account of Significance that prohibit the linguistic from entering into signifying relations with something non-linguistic, or something in Being and Time on linguistic considerations generally that doesn’t lend itself well to the character of circumspection. Heidegger’s conception of the Statement (Aussage) might be thought to fit the latter bill. I deal with that in the second essay, so I shall ignore it here.

I have already touched upon two proposed reasons for why Significance cannot allow language. The first is just to recognize that Heidegger’s account of Significance does not involve reference to linguistic considerations. But nothing follows from that unless we also assume that Heidegger meant to give a complete account of everything Significance pertains to prior to chapter five. That seems hasty. First, Significance is the Worldliness of the world, Heidegger says that the world is grounded in Being-in (BT: 51/55), and language is considered with respect to Being-in. Second, as emphasized by Svec (2017), Heidegger says that being-in-the-world is a unified phenomenon whose “primary datum must be seen as a whole”75. If Significance is to exclude linguistic things from entering signifying relations alongside non-linguistic things, we require some story that tells us how to square the unified with the exclusion, especially as it seems to be no problem for Reference, which is constitutive of Significance, to be involved with both the linguistic and the non-linguistic. Finally, there is nothing in Significance which stops us from conceiving linguistic things on the model of the sign-structure of the non-linguistic. Doing so only means that the linguistic share a pragmatic character with the non-linguistic, it neither reduces the linguistic to the non-linguistic/pragmatic nor situates it on top.

The second reason comes from the exclamation that Significance is the ontological condition of possibility for disclosing “significations” (Bedeutungen), which in turn found the possible being of words and language (BT: 82/86). It is crucial for the pragmatic reading that they secure an interpretation of “signification” as that which is already meaningful qua practically significant such that language and words merely articulate these meanings. Such meanings refer to a hammer being in-order-to hammer

75 BT p. 49/53
with, a bicycle being in-order-to cycle with, a desk being in-order-to write on, a house being for-the-sake of shelter etc. Our lives are rich with such meanings, that is true, but is language only about picking these up in a different manner? Does it not add substantially to the riches? I do not have a knock-down argument from within the bounds of the text that can count against such an interpretation, but it is by no means secure. First, there is an alternative interpretation available. On this interpretation, the founding relation concerns the character of signification as belonging to the beings of words or indeed any being at all, in so far as it is relevant for Da-sein. A signification in this sense is just something that signifies: “The for-the-sake-of-signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-in of letting something be relevant and the latter a what-with of relevance.” On the alternative interpretation, Heidegger’s point is that language maps on to the sign-structure of these referential relations. As I interpreted this earlier, when Rede gets spoken out, language explicates this relational whole. That is not to say that doing so is exclusively a matter of articulating already concrete practical meanings, only that what is linguistically and non-linguistically meaningful share the same significant character. Heidegger’s point is thus a holistic one, the totality of Significance is a condition of possibility for disclosing something like parts that stand as relevant in referentially signifying relations. Words are parts like that, and language trades on them. Second, the term ‘signification’ is used wildly throughout Being and Time to indicate different meanings of technical terms (the world has four significations, Statements have three etc.). Most of these refer to diverse ways in which to understand something, such as ontically and ontologically, or different phenomena, and so it doesn’t seem right to equate these with concrete practical meanings such as what it means to ride a bicycle. It is strange then that Heidegger should mean one thing by signification but use it differently. Third, since the alternative interpretation is available and since it makes sense of seemingly ordinary cases such as Adrian and Martin’s without running into the problem of unification that Svec presents, the pragmatic interpretation is by no means

76 BT p. 81/87
77 In the relevant passage Heidegger puts ‘signification’ in inverted scare quotes. I think this is to highlight the fact that strictly speaking there is nothing like a signification by itself; being a signification is being part of a whole.
secure. In fact, the burden seems to be on the pragmatic readers to convince us that their interpretation is the correct one.

If language can circumspectively orient, then, from an existential point of view, is speech always possible? Note that this does not turn on whether one’s tongue is attached, or whether speaking is always appropriate. Minimally, if you have the capacity to speak in the relevant sense, you have the capacity to think in words. The question is whether there is something capable of denying the existential possibility for actualizing linguistic capacities. *The third premise* depends on this not being the case. A challenge to this (the only one I know of) comes from the pragmatic reading of Hubert Dreyfus (2005; 2013) and his conception of ‘embodied coping’, so let’s consider that.

Embodied coping is a primary kind of intentionality purportedly derived from Heidegger. It is characterized by something Dreyfus calls “flow”. Flow is a way of being in expert performance to which linguistic behavior is purportedly disruptive, and which relates to the world in ways that is thought to preclude any form of conceptual or rational determination, what Dreyfus calls “mindedness”: “I hold that situation-specific mindedness, far from being a pervasive and essential feature of human being, is the result of a specific transformation of our pervasive mindless absorbed coping.”What is given in flow is fully accounted for and determined in relation to the body, with no excess, so to speak, left for the mind (or language). In this picture there is no room for the kind of linguistic shaping I deem, on behalf of *Rede* all pervasive. Moreover, if flow really is a thing, then insofar as I have ponied up on the congeniality of the instrumental and the constitutive conception of language (see section one), all the worse for me. But I think I’ll be all right. One part of Dreyfus’ account seems falsifiable and the other decidedly un-Heideggerian. It is the second point which is important here, so I allow myself a relaxed relation with the first.

*Prima facie*, I seem to be able to fall in and out of speech without falling in and out of a way of being. As Joseph Rouse (2000) has stressed, there surely are instances of flow in everyday speech itself, or if that is not good enough, think of a master orator. Should we count ordinary people as experts when

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78 Dreyfus 2007 p. 355
they eat, but amateurs when they speak? Also, Dreyfus doesn’t think language, or mindedness, gets into the game before there has been a disruption in coping behavior, but isn’t disruption a matter of degree, as in the degree to which a performance was hampered by the agent speaking? Can a degree of disruption be reconciled with an either or of linguistic involvement? Notably in this regard, Barbara Montero (2013) draws on her own experience as a professional ballet dancer in arguing that thinking can advance expert coping as much as it can hinder it. Moreover, doesn’t the fact that engaging in linguistic behavior can disrupt flow entail, rather than eliminate, the possibility that the world as experienced in flow can be subjected to linguistic considerations? These issues are too broad to get into here, but I remain unconvinced of the general idea that language gets into the game only after practical projects are disrupted.

What is of importance to me is that “flow” is Dreyfus’ idea, not Heidegger’s. Heidegger does affirm that malfunctioning equipment can lead to it loosing its character as equipment and be viewed as something objectively present instead, but he never mentions, as Schear (2007) reminds us, a genetic account of language as arising out of this. Moreover, equipment owes its character to Significance, and I already indicated how Heidegger’s conception of Significance may not be as pragmatic as Dreyfus might think. Further, it seems to me that the unified structure of being-in-the-world is exactly the kind of thing that is opposed to such dualisms as that between ‘body’ and ‘mind’. Being and Time at least, never reads as if these were separate things: Unless one maps a distinction of body and mind unto Heidegger’s distinction of the present at hand (objective presence) and the ready to hand (equipment)79, concepts such as ‘body’ and ‘mind’ seem to be deflated in his phenomenological language. Dreyfus’ account, then, is worked out in terms that does not rely on Heidegger’s own phenomenological language (though it may be seen to rely heavily on the language of other phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty). Thus, it cannot be seen to readily make its bed within the framework of Being and Time. Thus, even if “flow” is a thing, it doesn’t seem a Heideggerian thing, and so cannot count against the present argument.

79 The second essay argues explicitly against this view.
The fourth premise is formulated in tandem with Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology. It says that something is determined in accordance with the possibilities in which it figures. This trades on Heidegger’s transcendental method which, following Kant (as we saw in section two), implies that if we are to understand what the being of something is, we need to look at the a priori conditions that accompany it. These conditions, conditions of possibility, type that being as the kind of being it is. With respect to the conclusion of the argument: If it is always possible to speak about something, then what is to be spoken about is so that it is always possible to speak about it (even if very poorly). As of yet, I cannot think of a way to challenge the fourth premise which wouldn’t also challenge the very methodology of Being and Time.

The argument works on analogy with equipment. It’s not without complexity of course so perhaps an illustration could work to drive the point home. Imagine that your hands have mutated into hammers. Would the world look differently? Certainly, if we keep the notion of Significance in mind, a range of things, other than your hands, will be given (seen) otherwise than they would if your hands were just hands. In the absence of a grip, fences and walls may no longer appear climbable, cups will no longer afford drinking from etc., while things generally vulnerable to impact will be given in accordance with this in a way they weren’t before; moving through crowded stores and streets may require exceeding care, and the threshold for striking someone may decrease (or increase!). These are all modifications of referential relations. Having hammers for hands alters the possibilities beings are freed for. Now consider a concept or linguistic expression. It seems right to construe these on analogy with a ‘bound-tool’ given, and ignoring other differences, that they enter referential relationships and are hard to shake off. But the point of the argument concerns language as such so we must take this one step further. Imagine not having a body, would the world look differently now? The answer is, from the point of view of Being

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80 Hard but perhaps not impossible. Lisa Barrett and her lab were able to induce a temporary impairment to certain emotion related concepts which resulted in subjects being unable to differentiate appropriately between different expressions of emotion. See especially chapter 5 of her How Emotions are Made for a survey of such and similar findings. See also Barret 2017b for a presentation of her theory of constructed emotion which trades heavily on conceptuality.
and Time, that one cannot imagine the world in this way. Part of the reason is that the world which is to be imagined is characterized by Spatiality. Spatiality as Heidegger lays it out in §22-24 is an existential bound up with the sign-structure of equipment which is used, or acted upon, with respect to the ‘where’ of its being; where the equipment is and to where it points in circumspectively orienting Da-sein. (BT p. 96/104). This character of equipment obviously requires that Da-sein is embodied, for without it there is nothing that could do the acting. The specific possibilities that belong to equipment are thus bound up with the fact that one has a body; without it there is no equipmentality, no referential relations between equipment. Being embodied, in other words, makes for possibilities that shape the how of givenness of beings. Now, finally, we ask analogously: Imagine not having a language. If we were to walk around without the capacity to express anything, would the world still look as it does? The analogous answer is that this also is impossible. If beings are given in accordance with their possibilities, and speech, just like the body, always is bound up with possibilities, then by that fact the world should be determined in accordance with those possibilities just as in the case with the bodily ones. How innerworldly beings are should reflect it. In other words, since speech, unlike hammering, remains a constant possibility, and since, like hammering, it serves to circumspectively orient us, the givenness of the world in circumspective orientation must be sensitive to that possibility, just as it is in the special case of hammering.

That the givenness of innerworldly beings do reflect the possibility of speech is to say that they are given such that they are suitable to figure in the actualization of that possibility, in other words that they are suitable to figure in linguistic expressions. That is the conclusion of the argument. Importantly it concerns the form in which beings are given, the shape of their givenness, not the content, what is given, which sets it apart from a linguistic reading. Rede is linguaform Disclosure, the specific expressions of language and the specific possibilities they open for is not to the point of that. The point is that beings, including Da-sein (understanding itself as ‘a guest at a fine dinner’, or a ‘friend’ etc.) are such that they can figure in these possibilities. In this sense Rede is not language. Language, as the totality of words, has content. Rede concerns the shape of the givenness of that content. Just like Understanding
characterizes the givenness of beings in accordance with the possibilities opened for by practical dealings, *Rede* characterizes their givenness in accordance with the possibilities of opened for by language. The givenness of beings is equiprimordially determined by *Rede* and Understanding in this sense, or so I have argued.  

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I began by saying how it seems implausible to me that *Being and Time* could introduce language, or linguistic content, as cohabiting existentially with the other structures the book identifies. The way the pragmatic and linguistic readings of *Rede* turn on a rejection or affirmation of that idea is unfortunate because it makes it seem like constitutionalism or instrumentalism is rejected or affirmed along with it. I therefore called this conception of *Rede* disjunctive. My own reading of *Rede* is different in this regard. Heidegger writes that *Rede* is “existential language”.  

I choose to emphasize the first word over the latter and take this to mean ‘language understood transcendentally’, as opposed to ‘transcendence understood linguistically’. That is, I choose to read it as ‘language understood in terms of its condition of possibility’. This is what *Rede* is; not language or anything like it, but its “existential-ontological foundation”. Given that *Rede* simultaneously is a fundamental existential of Disclosedness (BT: 150/161), and Disclosedness has to do with the ways in which Da-sein is “there” in the world (BT: 125/132), I read *Rede* to mean that Da-sein is there in the world in such a way that it can put the world and innerworldly beings to words. That gives us a way to think about instrumentalism and constitutionalism as compatible.  

As I see it, the linguistic and the pragmatic readings have good and bad parts to them, and the good parts of both go together. The good part of the linguistic reading is the way it takes seriously the linguistic explication of *Rede*, and its emphasis on the linguistically meaningful landscape of human life; our

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81 Of course, just because this conception of *Rede* is entailed by premises Heidegger himself set up, doesn’t mean that Heidegger himself was aware of all that follows from them. But given the close connection between the argument and Heidegger’s own methodology, and the way the conclusion fits with everything else I have said in this text, it seems unlikely that Heidegger would be blind to this.

82 BT p. 151/161

83 BT p. 150/161
finding ourselves immersed in a language by which we make sense of who we are, each other, and the world. The bad part of the linguistic reading has to do with the way it transports constitutionalism into incoherence by understanding transcendence in terms of such a language. Conversely, what is bad about the pragmatic reading is the way it conceives language as nothing but a sophisticated piece of equipment derivative upon meanings which have already been practically articulated. With regards to this I suspect there is the worry that reinserting the logos at the bottom of Disclosure renders Heidegger’s radical transformation of the rational animal to acting animal redundant. But the worry is misplaced once we realize that he never transformed us into acting animals in the first place, what he really did was make rationality come to life as an activity. To philosophers, a pure instrumental component was never on offer, and should be taken of the Heideggerian table. And yet, that is not a rejection of instrumentalism. The good part of the pragmatic reading is its emphasis on the primacy of practice; the thesis that everything is given in accordance with its relevance to a concerned agent engaged in doing something.

I agree with the instrumental conception that language is used to express what is practically articulated. Significance, as we have seen, make up the world as structured by pragmatic relations, and it is this world that can be put to words. I also agree that speech itself has a pragmatic character, shared by equipment, in that it is itself confined to the structure of Significance: Speaking, like all activities must be confined to the in-order-to for-the-sake-of-which as it is grounded in Da-seins care for its own being. That, however, doesn’t commit me to hold that language itself is just a sophisticated kind of equipment, for I may also agree with a constitutional conception that holds that language, qua possibility, conditions experience.

When Heidegger says that Rede determines the other existentials equiprimordially (BT: 126/133) he is saying that the condition of possibility for language penetrate all aspects of the in-terms-of-which something is given. This is the only coherent sense in which Being and Time could be said to advocate a linguistic constitutionalism. Notably this kind of constitutionalism isn’t a matter of inflating perception with all kinds of linguistic meanings, it doesn’t necessarily make us see anything that depends on the
content of our language. It only says that perception is linguaform, suitable to be linguistically articulated. Admittedly, that seems to entail that the world as conceived has the same form as the world as perceived, that the world which correspond to my conceptions (in a non-theoretical situation dependent sense\textsuperscript{84}) is the same world, the same kind of world, that correspond to my perceptions. Perhaps this makes room for the fact that what we see can be influenced by what we say. But it doesn’t yet mean that everything we see correspond to what we say. After all, part of the point of this essay has been to argue that what we see is seen such that what we say can correspond to it. I suspect the correct thing to say with regards to the relationship between perceptual and linguistic content is that there is a degree to which the latter influences the former. The reading of Rede I advocate may entail that there can be such a degree, but that is a possibility, not a necessity.

Thus, there is a sense in which the instrumental and constitutional conceptions of language, pace the disjunctive reading, can go together. Furthermore, a strict division between linguistic and pragmatic determination is out of place; what is meaningful, that is content, has both linguistic and pragmatic conditions and so is always susceptible to co-determination by both. This correspond to what we might call knowing ‘that’ (what/where/why), and knowing ‘how’, if we let that distinction remain operative at all. Put in these terms the point isn’t that knowing how can be explained or explicated as knowledge that, but that what knowing how conditions, is also conditioned by knowing that, so that it can become the content of a that-clause even if it is a doing. It may be hard for me to express ‘what’ it is that I do when I sing in the rain, but singing in the rain is ‘what’ I do, so I can say ‘that’ I do it, and what I do, as it is done, is what I mean by saying it. What I did was conditioned by knowing how in the sense of it being a doing of mine, but simultaneously by knowing that in the sense that me having done so is what I mean by saying that I did it.\textsuperscript{85} Here, Rede ascertains that what I did was disclosed to me such that it could figure as the content of saying that I did it.

\textsuperscript{84} The second essay makes room for conceptions in such a sense.
\textsuperscript{85} For some considerations of this sort see McDowell’s (2013) objection to Dreyfus account of intentionality. Dreyfus account rests on there being different things corresponding to knowing how and knowing that. What McDowell
Whether the instrumental and constitutive conceptions of language are truly compatible remains to be seen. What I have tried to do is make available a way to read *Rede* which doesn’t force us to choose selectively between them at the outset. But my reading has other advantages. It sits well with Heidegger’s methodology, and seems to be entailed, if my argument goes through, by his conception of the referential sign-structure that make up Worldliness. As I tried to show in section three, it also makes sense of *Rede* as a moment in the overall project of *Being and Time*, and it can be integrated into his framework in a way that accords with the technical details of §31, §32, and §34. Finally, it respects Heidegger’s linguistic explication in a way a pragmatic reading doesn’t, without introducing any incoherent determinacy (since it doesn’t rely on a notion of content that would bear such determinacy) that we saw Inkpin worry about with regards to the linguistic reading. If all the above has been convincing, then the reading of *Rede* I have recommended seems superior to the well-known linguistic and pragmatic alternatives. Both readings have their strengths, but we can place the discussion on firmer ground than either is erected on. Specifically, we’d do well to avoid the unwarranted assumption that in so far as Heidegger meant to connect *Rede* with language he meant to square it with some notion of linguistic content (meanings/concepts/structure). This should allow the secondary literature to become relaxed about the relationship between the praxeological framework developed prior to the introduction of *Rede* and the latter’s linguistic explication.

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lacks, and Heidegger has, is descriptions corresponding to existential conditions which can be put forth against the core tenets of Dreyfus’ account.
Unlocking the Conceptualism of Being and Time

In the previous essay I read Heidegger’s conception of Rede in Being and Time to imply that perceptual experience is shaped by language. I now go further and claim that in Being and Time Heidegger is, in his own way, a conceptualist about perception (hermeneutical seeing ‘as’ in Heidegger’s terms). I think this is so because Heidegger in §32 seem straightforward about it. Still, a well-established reading of Being and Time, the perhaps most influential proponents of which have been Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carman, and Mark Wrathall, remains decidedly non-conceptualist. A reason to disregard the otherwise straightforward endorsement of conceptualism is that Being and Time doesn’t treat concepts other than in connection with ‘the Statement (Aussage)’, and ‘the Statement’, in Heidegger’s own words, has the present at hand as its specialty (BT:148/158). The being which is present at hand is such that it cannot be the primary object of everyday perception, hence binding conceptuality to the present at hand seemingly precludes conceptualism. However, if it could be demonstrated that Statements can be about the ready to hand (the kind of beings which are the objects of everyday perception), then concepts would not be so bound, and the conceptualist remarks would be granted their weight. Doing so is the purpose of this essay. In the first section I lend an ear to a fellow conceptualist in arms Sacha Golob, before I clarify how Carman’s (2003) reading of Heidegger’s conceptualist remarks rely on a specific set of conceptions bound up with a certain interpretation of Heidegger’s treatment of the Statement (BT §33). In section two I develop an alternative reading of §33 that deals with some well-known problematic aspects. In section three I make use of Heidegger’s earlier notion of the concept as formal indication to clarify how the Statement can intend both the ready to hand and the present at hand. This involves identifying the conditions under which it does either and illustrate what is going on as the shift occurs. I
end by noting how my alternative reading of §33 should dissuade us from adopting Carman’s non-conceptualist conception, allowing Heidegger’s conceptualist remarks to speak for themselves.

I

I follow Sacha Golob’s (2015) critique of what he dubs the Carman-Wrathall model; a by now standard interpretation of Being and Time that induce a bad take on conceptuality. To get at this, I track Taylor Carman’s (2003) subscription to a set of conceptions that binds him to that model and argue that those conceptions are incompatible with §32. However, Carman appeals to Heidegger’s discussion of Statement in §33 to support his claims. With recourse to Schear (2007), I identify the aspects of §33 which are problematic with respect to §32.

Carman’s Conceptions

If we adopt a wide definition of ‘content’ as that which is given in perceptual experience, I believe the Heidegger of Being and Time is a conceptualist about that. Specifically, he gives us reasons to believe that Interpretation, the condition in which entities are determined ‘as’ being so and such, is partly conceptual in character. The position amounts to one where Da-sein’s conceptual capacities are drawn on, always and without further ado, in making sense of the world. Here I agree with Sacha Golob, who notes that the dominant approach in Heidegger scholarship, advocated by Taylor Carman and Mark Wrathall, opposes his own (See his 2014; 2015), hence mine.

86 I use ‘entities’, ‘beings’ and ‘things’ interchangeably. These can refer to both the present at hand and the ready to hand. I use “object” to refer to what is strictly present at hand.
87 An ado might here be some occurrence which instigates a “stop-and-think” approach to the circumstances, such as an obstacle in one’s path, engaging with conceptual material, or authentically owning up to one’s mortality etc.
The Carman-Wrathall model (CWM), as Golob dubs it, is the view that the kind of entities Heidegger calls present at hand, entities taken under a mode of determination which is in some sense *derivative*, is tied to propositional intentionality with the implication that there is another form of intentionality upon which the propositional kind rests that identifies some aspect ‘x’ of entities which propositions (or judgments) cannot in principle capture. The reason for this is that judgments bestow upon the world some necessarily determinate form in which the ‘x’ (not being so determinate) cannot figure.\(^8\) They are right that Heidegger speaks about a form of intentionality which is derivative in that sense, and that this is tied to propositional intentionality (intending something by judging it). But there is a question as to whether this is the only kind of propositional intentionality that figure in the framework of *Being and Time*.

If Golob and I are to defend a conceptualist reading, we need to find some way to dissociate concepts as they figure in judgments from the present at hand. The way we do this differ crucially and pursuing Golob’s approach is beyond what I can do here.\(^9\) Though I agree with much of what he has to say against the CWM, our criticisms of the CWM diverge accordingly. I will deal primarily with Carman (2003) as it suites my purpose to oppose exactly the line of thought he lays out. That line involves three conceptions, none of which, I think, is shared by Heidegger.

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\(^8\) This is, roughly, the position found in Wrathall (2010) and Carman (2003). See Golob (2015 §4) for his own extended characterization.

\(^9\) Golob’s suggestion turns on a rather unorthodox reading of Heidegger’s distinction between beings and being. To him Da-sein’s understanding of the latter turns on its being familiar with a ‘prototype’ which the former is structured by or modeled on. Golob argues that the prototype fits criteria for conceptuality, and yet is not propositional. Additionally, he suggests that it is to avoid an explanatory regress that Heidegger introduces the distinction. I am not (yet) convinced of his unorthodox approach, and I worry that it paints the relationship between being and beings with an epistemological rather than a phenomenological brush. It seems to leave Heidegger with the work of delivering transcendental arguments, each argument turning on a different prototype, to explain how we come to understand as we do, rather than delivering descriptions as to how beings are in their ways of being. If the ‘prototype’ is thought to be something with explanatory value, it would be redundant if nothing were to be explained. Though certainly interesting, I cannot pursue his line of thinking here. I urge the reader to see especially chapter three of his *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, Normativity* (2014), and judge for themselves.
The first conception is that we can intelligibly depict the intentionality of Da-sein on a distinction between something like ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ such that the former predates and preconditions the latter:

“Conditions specific to knowledge are not necessarily conditions of interpretation generally. What is necessary for propositional thought might not be necessary for having an understanding of things being, and being such and such. The conditions of knowing that are not identical with the conditions of knowing how, then, since the latter include the former but not vice versa.”

Carman (2003 p. 209 -12) extracts this picture from passages (esp. in §13 and §32) where Heidegger distinguishes circumspective

seeing, a type of awareness permeated with purposiveness whereby entities are encountered in terms of their reference to each other and functional value to a task at hand (the ready to hand), from a “pure perception of something” where the entity, as it were, is encountered as objectively present (the present at hand). Heidegger traces these phenomenally distinct kinds of seeing to distinct kinds of beings seen. The upshot of the passages is that, in its negligence of being (as Heidegger calls it), philosophy has conceived of only those entities that correspond to the founded kind of seeing, the object of pure perception, thus covering over the more primordial kind of entity that corresponds to circumspective seeing. We can defer the details; the point is that Carman reenacts the distinction between the two kinds of awareness in terms of what fits and doesn’t fit conceptual knowledge. Only the derivative kind do. Thus, he writes: “Understanding means knowing how, and it precedes and makes possible cognition, or knowing that”

The second conception, also evident from the first quote above, construes knowing that on the model of propositional thought. Carman ties the ‘that’ of knowing that to the content articulated by propositions that predicate properties of a subject. Such content, as we shall see, is determinate in a way the ready to hand is not. Thinking that conceptual knowledge must be construed on such a notion of determinacy, he

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90 Carman 2003 p. 24
91 Throughout, circumspective seeing will be used somewhat interchangeably with hermeneutic and pre-predicative seeing
92 Carman 2003 p. 207
writes that Heidegger “wants to avoid any surreptitious reading of the structures and contents of propositionally articulated thought back into the preconceptual skills and attitudes of everyday practical understanding.”

The third conception locks conceptuality to propositional thought in taking concepts to be the constitutive elements of propositional attitudes to the exclusion of whatever else Heidegger may say of them. This is illustrated well when Carman resists taking a passage wherein Heidegger describes the way Understanding, the transcendental structure which grounds circumspective seeing, works itself out in terms of conceptuality as having to do with conceptuality proper. This cannot be, he thinks, because fully articulate concepts are “the recurring and reidentifiable constituents of propositional contents.” In quoting the relevant passage from the text he goes on to translate ‘conceptuality’ (Begrifflichkeit) as ‘conceivability’ (Begreiflichkeit), without notice. Though it serves to protect circumspective kind of seeing from the conceptual import the relevant passage suggests, this is simply not what Heidegger writes. Perhaps Carman wants to rectify what he sees as a misleading remark. In any case, I shall argue that he is mistaken in this, and the mistake repeats itself when he deems Heidegger’s linguistic explication of Rede “obviously misleading”, on account of Heidegger’s previous discussion of what it takes for something to be an ‘about which’ of the Statement.

Carman’s conceptions thus go: (c1) Knowing how predates and conditions knowing that; (c2) knowing that is a topic of a propositional kind of intentionality; (c3) propositional content is biconditionally bound up with conceptuality as such. Putting together the first two makes it seem like knowing how is intentionally structured to preclude propositional content. Adding the third, we get a

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93 Ibid p. 217
94 Ibid p. 214
95 He may be excused in this if he adopted the Macquarrie and Robinson translation in which this oversight regrettably occurs.
96 Carman 2003 p. 227
conception of intentionality that excludes conceptuality. But (c3) is false, which, as I will return to in the concluding section, renders (c2) unstable, and (c1) misleading.\textsuperscript{97}

\textit{Carman’s Mistake}

Carman’s conceptions are intimately connected. My general aim is to shake confidence in (c1). The best way to do that is to attack (c3).

We can couch (c3) as the claim that concepts are items in a founded mode of being in the world. What support does Carman offer for this claim? The question is perfectly legitimate since the claim itself cannot be extracted from \textit{Being and Time} by default. After all, as we have seen, Carman himself indicates at least two passages in \textit{Being and Time} where we are misled to think contrary to it. I dealt with the linguistic explication of Rede in the previous essay, so I will confine myself to the first. The answer, given that much rests upon it, is surprisingly scant. The problem for Carman is that, as Heidegger lays it out:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Understanding is \textit{not} a founded mode of being-in the world.
  \item Understanding is intimately connected with conceptuality.
\end{enumerate}

Carman, of course, agrees with \textit{a}: Understanding is an existential structure of Disclosedness and so is \textit{founding}, not \textit{founded}. In turn, there can be no intentional relationship independent of, or prior to, whatever Understanding brings with it. That is why Carman needs a proper rejection of \textit{b}. But, here is some of what Heidegger writes in \textsection32\textsuperscript{98}:

1. “The circumspect, interpretive association with what is at hand in the surrounding world which “sees” this as a table, a door, a car, a bridge does not necessarily already have to analyze what is

\textsuperscript{97} What I say is not restricted to Carman in the CWM. There is more than enough in Wrathall to assume that what I say count against him as well. He is straightforward about his commitment, which he thinks Heidegger shares, to an underlying non-conceptual, and pragmatic kind of intentionality, and like Carman he defends this commitment in part through Heidegger’s discussion of Statement. See especially his “Non-rational Grounds and Non-Conceptual Content” (2005)

\textsuperscript{98} I quote from BT p. 140-1/149-50
circumspectly interpreted in a particular statement. Any simple prepredicative seeing of what is at hand is in itself already understanding and interpretative.”

2. “The seeing of this sight is always already understanding and interpreting. It contains the explicitness of referential relation (of the in-order-to) which belong to the totality of relevance in terms of which what is simply encountered is understood.”

3. “Interpretation does not, so to speak, throw a “significance” over what is nakedly objectively present and does not stick a value on it, but what is encountered in the world is always already in a relevance which is disclosed in the understanding of world, a relevance which is made explicit by interpretation.”

4. “The interpretation can draw the conceptuality belonging to beings to be interpreted from these themselves or else force them into concepts to which beings are opposed in accordance with their kind of being. The interpretation has always already decided, finally or provisionally, upon a definite conceptuality; it is grounded in a fore-conception.”

Here Heidegger is underway delineating the as-structure of Interpretation as it is grounded in the fore-structures of the Understanding, one of which is fore-conception (Vorgriff). The as-structure of Interpretation describes ways in which we, in our everyday practical dealings with the world, (circumspectively) see something as something (seeing something under an aspect). This is the kind of seeing that the CWM thinks cannot, due to some aspect ‘x’, involve the kind of intentionality conceptuality is bound up with. Indeed, the point of 1. is to dislodge seeing ‘as’ from the kind of seeing associated with Statements, which is predicative (or propositional). The point of 2. is to certify that seeing pre-predicatively is no less seeing something explicitly as being so and such than predicative seeing is. Predicative seeing is aspectual in the sense that its seeing involves determining something in relation to some specific concept or predicate. The point of 3. is to deny that Interpretation sees in a way that might be thought to conform to predicative or propositional seeing; where an entity first encountered naked of meaning is subsequently dressed up in a judgment by which it becomes significant. This follows

99 Griff directly translated means ‘grip’. This encourages an ambiguity between conception (in the non-conceptual sense of a grasp) and concept (Begriff). However, Heidegger surrounds the term with references to conceptuality (Begrifflichkeit) so it seems intuitive to read it along conceptual lines. See also footnote 53 in the first essay.
Heidegger’s famous explication of Da-sein as being-in a world where the seeing and seen is inextricably interwoven. All this is what Carman tries to capitalize upon with the pre-predicatively formulated, and thus, by his conceptions, conceptually resistant, aspect ‘x’. So far, so good. Until it comes crashing down with 4, where Heidegger effectively ties Interpretation and hence pre-predicative seeing and practicality to conceptuality in two guises.

The definite conceptuality has its ground in the *fore-structures* of Understanding, which is characterized in terms of presuppositions on the basis of which the Interpretation grasps the entities it does, a prejudice on behalf of the interpreter “necessarily there in each point of departure of the interpretation as what is already ‘posited’ with the interpretation as such, that is pre-given with fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception.” To make sense of this it helps to note that Understanding, according to Heidegger, existentially grounds Interpretation as its own development, in a manner such that Understanding becomes itself through Interpretation (BT: 139/148). Understanding thus works itself out in Interpretation by understanding something as something. The suggestion is that when Understanding works itself out through Interpretation, through determining something as something, it does so necessarily on the basis of a set of presuppositions involving, among other things, a conceptual prejudice it enjoys in advance of any given interpretation (the fore-conception). Since Understanding, being a fundamental existential of disclosure, conditions all seeing, we are seemingly urged, *prima facie*, to interpret Heidegger as a conceptualist: Whenever something is understood as something, whenever something is encountered as significant, as is the case with both the ready to hand and the present at hand, a definite conceptuality has been settled upon. If this stands, it constitutes a silver bullet against Carman’s (c3).

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100 BT p. 141/150
101 Perhaps we can interpret “settled upon” as ‘having been made available’ with respect to some circumstance. In encountering the ready to hand, then, no less than the present at hand, there are concepts fit to address that encounter readily available since they have been drawn on already to make sense of that encounter. Making use of those concepts then would not disrupt the encounter in any significant way.
It is important to note that one cannot, on behalf of Carman, respond to all this by reiterating the non-conceptual explication of Significance that Heidegger has given earlier in the text (see esp. §§17-18). What Heidegger seems to be saying with 1.- 4. is precisely that pre-predicative seeing makes Significance explicit in ways that has to do with conceptuality, and that this is due to the nature of Understanding which grounds Significance.\textsuperscript{102} It would be incautious to assume that the earlier exposition could be relied upon for the full story at this point. Carman requires independent reasons to contest both that pre-predicative seeing is conceptual – otherwise aspect ‘x’ cannot be said to resist a conceptual grasp in that conceptually grasping is part of what it would be for Interpretation to settle upon a definite conceptuality – and that fore-conception is intimately connected with conceptuality. Otherwise the \textit{prima facie} implication is that Understanding and conceptual capacities are enjoined. I think that as far as §32 goes, Carman lacks such reasons.

On the first point Carman writes:

“Fore-conception in Heidegger’s sense, it seems to me, involves nothing like fully articulated concepts, that is, recurring and reidentifiable constituents of propositional contents. For example, Heidegger nowhere says that fore-conceptual aspects of interpretation correspond to particular linguistic terms.”\textsuperscript{103}

And he is perfectly right. But this, again, is his conception (c3) of conceptuality as bound up with propositional thought. Propositional thought is predicative. But the present point is that with the two claims I mentioned above (\textit{a} and \textit{b}) Heidegger seem to say that the conceptual can be pre-predicative. Carman takes the suggestion that the pre-predicative is conceptual on an understanding of what it means to be conceptual that cannot lend itself to the pre-predicative and so he dismisses the suggestion immediately. But the right thing to do, it seems to me, is to take the suggestion that the conceptual can

\textsuperscript{102} My suspicion is that a narrow focus upon chapter three has led the pragmatic school of Heideggerians to mistake what is meant as a structural account of intelligibility as a step towards uncovering the Worldhood of the world for a pragmatic account of intelligibility itself.

\textsuperscript{103} Carman 2003 p. 214
be pre-predicative seriously and attempt to derive a conception of what it means to be conceptual from it. It seems to me that what is on offer here, on Heidegger’s part, could be a unique way to understand what it means for something to be conceptual. That ought to be contended with and so one cannot just assume against \( b \) its impossibility. That would be to force upon the interpretation of the text a certain fore-conception regarding the nature of conceptuality.

On the second point, Carman’s tactic is to sever fore-conception from the other fore-structures of Understanding called fore-sight and fore-having. Briefly, the first refer to our having a background understanding of the world as made up of a totality of referential relationships, on which we draw (implicitly) in making sense of things, meaning that we make sense of them as standing in certain relationships to other entities (BT 140/150). The second refers to the point of view or perspective one always takes in such making sense of things; the bottle of whiskey means one thing to the cowboy in a bar-fight, and another to the one sitting in the corner drowning his sorrows. Being familiar with something and coming from somewhere are thus conditions by which we make sense of things. The same with fore-conception, it seems to me. Not to Carman, however. For him, where the former two are genuine conditions of Interpretation, the latter is a “proper-feature”\(^{104}\) of it. By proper feature he means an actual register of “concrete gestural demonstrative comportments that constitute our interpretive practice.”\(^{105}\)

“Prior to the conceptual regimentation of discrete linguistic subjects and predicates, that is, we have a kind of shared vocabulary of expressive gestures that we can recognize in a rough and ready ways across a wide variety of disparate situations and contexts.”\(^ {106}\)

He has in mind such things as raising eyebrows and shrugging shoulders. He calls them expressive comportments. But that is an odd move, tailor made to suit his pragmatic inclinations. If Heidegger meant to say that such things as raising eyebrows and shrugging are constitutive of our interpretative “practice”

\(^{104}\) ibid.
\(^{105}\) ibid. p. 215
\(^{106}\) ibid.
as opposed to the existential framework belonging to Interpretation as such, then we ought to be puzzled as to why he went on to include fore-conception, without further explanation, in a part of the text whose title is *The Existential Constitution of the There*; a part meant to be discussing the transcendental conditions of possibilities of, among other things, such interpretative practices. Instead of including a reference to expressive comportments that *make up* interpretative practice, why not include the condition of possibility for it instead? More importantly, Heidegger seems bent on thinking these fore-structures together, that is presumably why he labels them together as the fore-structures of the Understanding, and Heidegger seems quite explicit about all three being conditions of Interpretation when he writes: “Meaning [*Sinn*], structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception is the upon which of the project in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something”\(^\text{107}\). Concrete gestural demonstrative comportment may be constitutive of some (or under a wide enough definition, all) interpretative practice, but it cannot be the *how*, the in-terms-of-which, something becomes intelligible as something. Nothing concrete, nothing short of a transcendental structure, could, in Heidegger’s framework, be in the business of doing that.

Carman notes that Heidegger nowhere says that fore-conceptual aspects of interpretation correspond to particular linguistic terms, but that seems to have prompted him to ask: How can we explain away the references to conceptuality in Heidegger’s descriptions of the pre-predicative way of seeing? The better question would be: How can we understand conceptuality in such a way that would detach it from propositional thought and predication? Asking the former question, not the latter, is, I think, Carman’s mistake. In fairness to Carman, as Golob (2015) notes, the CWM seems to draw heavily on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological conception of motor-intentionality.\(^\text{108}\) Perhaps the CWM is motivated more by phenomenological than exegetical concerns. But even so we ought to take seriously the suggestion that conceptuality can be pre-predicative. Not doing so is a mistake. In all the following I shall go some way in attempting to correct it.

\(^{107}\) BT p. 142/151
\(^{108}\) See Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception*. For its integration into Heidegger’s thought see Dreyfus’ “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental” (2005).
Setting the Stage

Though there is not much in §32 that supports Carman’s non-conceptual reading of it, the non-conceptualist reader need look no further than §33 for encouragement. Though Heidegger does say that pre-predicative Interpretation settles upon a definite conceptuality, he does not address concepts as such until it is time to clarify the role of predication as part of the Statement, the existential condition of possibility for expressing judgments. Add to this Heidegger’s suggestion that the Statement specializes in objective presence (BT: 148/158), and the elements required to assemble the CWM are in place: If the present at hand is derivative, which it is, and Heidegger asserts that the Statement is a derivative mode of Interpretation, which he does, then, it seems, in this picture, that concepts come derivatively sandwiched: Concepts occupy or occur in a derivatory mode of being, and they map correspondingly derivatory beings. Or so the thought goes. But §32 urges us to think that, at least, the last conjunct is mistaken; consistency, if Heidegger was at all consistent here, requires of us a way to dislodge conceptuality from the present at hand. If we succeed at that, then we can begin to think about a way to get conceptuality back into the pre-predicative game. I think this can be done, though quite a few issues must be tackled on the way.

As we have seen, the CWM, in stressing the derivatory character of propositional intentionality, binds propositions by necessity to the present at hand, and Heidegger is explicit, at least, about there being a class of statements that intends in that way. Taking statements to express judgments, the question is whether that way of intending (intending the objectively present) is coextensive with all judgments. I call the class of judgments that are coextensive with statements intending in that way ‘propositions’, and those that (hypothetically) aren’t ‘assertions’. (I use ‘statement’ uncapitalized as neutral with respect to which kinds of entities are intended). Members of the former class will intend entities only as present at hand, members of the latter will not. We can be certain that the first class exists because Heidegger, as we shall see, analyzes the present at hand by means of propositions. We may agree with the CWM that
propositional intentionality for Heidegger is derivative, while disagree that propositions are bound by necessity to the present at hand. Such is the position of Golob (2014). According to him, even a derivative mode of intending can intend the ready to hand. Assertion is to him is a derivative mode of intending. So, we have two questions: Whether all judgments necessarily intend the present at hand, and whether all judgments necessarily belong to a derivative mode of intending? The CWM’s answer is respectively ‘Yes’ and ‘Yes’, Golob’s answer is ‘No’ and ‘Yes’, and looking ahead, my answer will be ‘No’ and ‘No’.

I won’t bother with the CWM’s answer. Besides Golob’s critical remarks, Joseph Schear, in an admirable piece of scholarship, thoroughly assesses its answer and finds it wanting. Part of the point there is to examine multiple ways one might take to ascertain that judgments and the present at hand necessarily go together; none hold up. But the same end would be had if it could be demonstrated that judgments can intend the ready to hand, and that is part of the point here. In that regard I would like to work with some of Schear’s insights.

Schear points to Heidegger talking as if judgments can in fact intend the ready to hand, as when it is written that: “the entities to which it [the Statement] is related as something that uncovers, are either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.\textsuperscript{111}; “The ready-to-hand can become an “object” of a science without having to lose its character as equipment.”\textsuperscript{112}; and the often commented upon passage where he speaks as if the difference in intending the present at hand and the ready to hand is a matter of degree:

“There are many interim stages between interpretation which is quite enveloped in heedful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical statement about objectively present things: statements about events in the surrounding world, descriptions of what is ready to hand, ‘reports on situations,’ noting and ascertaining a ‘factual situation’, describing a state of affairs,

\textsuperscript{109} Though there is a question here as to what ought to count for something to be derivative on which me and Golob differ.\textsuperscript{110} See his “Judgment and Ontology in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit” (2007).\textsuperscript{111} BT p. 224 as quoted in Schear 2007 \textsuperscript{112} BT p. 362 as quoted in Schear 2007
telling about what has happened. These “sentences” cannot be reduced to theoretical propositional statements without essentially distorting their meaning.”

This latter is a somewhat puzzling passage. It would be nice to have a conception of judgments that could account for it, and I shall give one. In any case, only the theoretical statement would count as propositions in my diction, the rest of the examples would be assertions. With this in mind, why would one, like the CWM answer ‘Yes’ to the first question above? According to Schear (2007) the reason has to do with what he calls ‘the influential passage’. We can single out two parts of it, the first has to do with what it means for an entity to be the ‘object’ of a Statement:

“The entity which is held in our fore-having – for instance, the hammer – is initially ready-to-hand as an item of equipment. If this entity becomes the ‘object’ of a statement, then as soon as we begin with this statement, there is already a change-over in the fore-having. The ready-to-hand entity with which we have to do turns into something about which the statement that makes manifest is made. Our fore-sight is aimed at something present-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand.”

The trick for those like Golob, Schear and myself, who want to detach the expression of a judgment from intending the present at hand, is to explain the consistency of that with the change-over (Umschlag): that when something ready to hand becomes the ‘object’ of the judgment our fore-sight is aimed at something present at hand in it. Golob is awake to the challenge, and I make some use of his reply below. But there is still the question as to how the Statement enables the change-over to occur. On that he is silent. The second part has to do with what is called the specialty of statement (der Vorzug der Aussage):

“The ‘as’ gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand. It sinks to the structure of just letting one see what is present-at-hand in a determinate way. This leveling of the originary ‘as’ of circumspective interpretation to the ‘as’ with which the present-at-hand is given a determinate character is the specialty of Statement.”

113 BT p. 148/158 (translation modified).
114 ibid.
115 ibid.
To this we ought to wonder about the nature of the leveling, how the Statement effect it, and the sense in which it could be said to be its *speciality*. Given that concepts are constituents of the Statement, any dig at conceptuality in *Being and Time* requires getting the transcendental character of the Statement right.

It might seem like the textual evidence in favor of assertions settles the issue immediately against the non-conceptualist appeal to §33. If that was the case, we could rest assured that Carman’s alleged mistake is in fact a mistake. But with ‘the influential passage’ things become less straightforward. As Schear (2007) notes, in taking it into consideration the textual evidence becomes far from decisive. Instead of relying on these remarks alone, I shall make use of them to go on to provide a, to my knowledge, novel account of §33 that, with respect to the above, indicates the senses in which Statement is and is not derivative; yield both propositions and assertions; admit of ‘degrees’ when construing the relationship between the assertion and the proposition; and remain consistent with ‘the influential passage’ while contributing to our understanding of the change-over and the phenomena of leveling. \(^{116}\)

II

The section on Statement seem to constitute a proper obstacle for those, like myself, who read Heidegger as a conceptualist. It seeming that way issues, I suspect, from taking the point of the section to be that the Statement is derivative, that is, distinct from Interpretation. I argue for an alternative reading where the point of the section is to secure that the judgment, understood as a locus of truth, can be grounded in Interpretation. The Statement is both a kind of circumspective Interpretation, and capable of undergoing a modification that renders it derivatory upon circumspection.

*The Apophantic ‘as’*

\(^{116}\) Note that all the points are results of phenomenological analysis, and so, if Heidegger is right, are general conditions that any account of conceptuality ought to conform to.
As a derivative mode of Interpretation (BT: 144/153) ‘Statement’ does not refer exactly to statements as the sort of things that are heard, said or read. I have capitalized the former to highlight its transcendental character, meaning that it is the condition of possibility for stating. That it is a “derivative mode” means that the seeing ‘as’ receives its own development in the Statement. Accordingly, Heidegger distinguishes between the hermeneutic as of circumspective Interpretation, and the apophantic as of the Statement. He defines Statement as “a pointing out which communicates and determines”.¹¹⁷ The three significations of pointing out, predication (determining) and communication, refer respectively to letting something ‘show itself from itself’, ‘in a definite determination’, ‘with others as shared’. Though the significations are interconnected and unified, the first two significations capture the apophantic character that is the most interesting for my present purposes, so I confine myself to these. Heidegger writes:

“Every predication is what it is only as a pointing out. The second signification of statement has its foundation in the first. The elements which are articulated in predication, subject-predicate, originate within the pointing out. Determining does not first discover, but as a mode of pointing out initially limits seeing precisely to what shows itself [as such] in order to manifest explicitly what is manifest in its determinacy through the explicit limitation of looking. When confronted with what is already manifest, with the hammer which is too heavy, determining must first take a step back. “Positing the subject” dims beings down to focus on “the hammer there” in order to let what is manifest be seen in its determinable definite character through this dimming down.”¹¹⁸

This is a decisive passage (I will call it ‘the decisive passage’) as far as the interpretation of the concept in Being and Time goes, so I’ll be clear about some things I gather from it. First, with “pointing out” Heidegger is not saying that the self-showing of beings begins with the Statement ex nihilo. He is saying that the pointing out of beings themselves belong to the Statement in the sense that the self-showing of entities is something to which the Statement is intrinsically connected. Accordingly, I think that in so far

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¹¹⁷ BT p. 146/156 (translation modified).
¹¹⁸ BT p. 145/155
as Heidegger ties the ‘something that shows itself from itself (or in itself)’ to *apophansis*, it is slightly misleading that it contrasts with the hermeneutic. Circumspective seeing, is also a seeing of beings in their self-showing, and would thus be subsumed under this meaning of *apophansis*. At the same time, the apophantic should not be contrasted too heavily with the hermeneutic given that the ‘apophantic as’, retains the Interpretative structure. This is a point of importance for Heidegger to which I return below.

Second, Heidegger construes the relationship between pointing out and predication on an analogy of a movement from implicit to explicit. The predication works in tandem with that which shows itself, releasing, as it were, the predicate from the pointed out to determine the being explicitly in accordance with it. This aligns with Heidegger seeking to demonstrate that the fore-structures of Interpretation are contained within the Statement.

[W]hen one begins to determine something, one has a directed viewpoint, of what is to be stated. The statement needs a fore-sight in which the predicate which is to be delineated and attributed is itself loosened, so to speak, in its *inexplicit* enclosure in beings themselves.

What this implicit-explicit analogy may suggest, pace Carman, is that the Statement does not itself contribute to discover the entities by harboring concepts, “the recurring and reidentifiable constituents of propositional contents” at a level distinct from circumspective seeing. Given the “inexplicit enclosure” it seems we ought to take pre-predicative to mean pre-predicating, not pre-predicate. The non-conceptualist may object that this fore-sight is the kind of fore-sight that aims at “something present at hand in the ready to hand”, I give a rejoinder to that in the final section.

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119 Heidegger ties *apophansis* for statements to indicate his desire to return to the Greek understanding of Logos, as it was Aristotle’s term for the declarative sentence. See Sheehan (1988) for an exposition of the relationship between the hermeneutic and apophantic as Heidegger gathers it from Aristotle’s: *On Hermeneia*.

120 BT p. 147/157 (my emphasis).

121 Interestingly, he further claims that a significant articulation, qualified as a definite set of concepts, belongs to Statement in its predicative and communicative function, and that this renders the fore-conception, also always contained in the Statement, mostly inconspicuous. (see BT p. 147/157). Why does concepts render fore-conception inconspicuous? Presumably because the conceptual grasp of the object intended in a Statement is itself not a matter of note if the object conform to already explicitly articulated concepts. This hints at the conceptual grasp as something not necessarily bound to the developed set of concepts contained in language.
Third, when speaking of the explicit limitation of looking Heidegger construes predicating on par with attention. He characterizes limitation as a case of “dimming down” beings to focus on the subject, a “positing the subject”, and he says that this requires that “determination must first take a step back” (BT: 147/157). The reason for this seems to have to do with a difference between the hermeneutic ‘as’ and the apophantic ‘as’. In the hermeneutic ‘as’ the seeing of beings is a seeing of beings in terms of other beings. I understand (see) the keys in my pocket in terms of the lock; I understand the lock in terms of the door; I understand the door in terms of the kitchen it leads to etc. (this is a set of referential relationships that ultimately refer to Da-sein understanding itself in terms of some possibility it takes up; cooking for instance). The apophantic determination, on the other hand, necessitates that determining does not confine itself to absorption within referential relations that make up the hermeneutical ‘as’. If it did, the givenness of the lock, the way it presents itself to me, would depend solely on the way it is signified by my keys and itself signifies the opening of the door. Those relations, which Heidegger describes in detail in chapter 3 of Being and Time, requires dimming down if the lock is to be posited as the subject of self-showing.

The decisive passage is troublesome if one subscribes to the popular conception of absorbed coping as formulated by Dreyfus (2005) and carried on by the CWM. This is because taking a step back to posit a subject should amount to a disruption of a primary mode of intentionality (it should be enough to miss the aspect ‘x’) in that being absorbed in these relations are thought to be what constitutes this mode. Yet Heidegger writes as if it doesn’t, and that seems right to me.

First, as we have seen, “the influential passage” (BT: 148/158) points to a disruption occurring with the Statement, in terms of a change-over and a leveling, yet the language of ‘the influential passage’, differs remarkably from that of ‘the decisive passage’ (BT: 144/155). In ‘the influential passage’ he no longer speaks of a ‘dimming down’ of beings, but a ‘severing’ of referential relations between them, and

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122 See Carman 2003 p.246 where he contrasts the aspects under which we understand entities as constituted by absorbed skillful practice, with the aspects constituted by saying things of them. Similarly, Wrathall 2011 p. 20-21 thinks that the dimming down effects a change of content (from previously non-conceptual to conceptual) that follows moving away from a practical articulation and over to a conceptual one.
he does not speak of the Statement positing a ‘subject’ together with a predicate, but of something having become the “object” of a Statement. His initial characterization of the Statement does not involve a disruptive language, yet amounts to that kind of thing that for the CWM ought to interfere with primary intentionality. It is as if Heidegger and the CWM disagrees on where to insert the disruptive element. But what should cause real trouble for the CWM, what counts as *modus tollens* against it, is that Heidegger in ‘the decisive passage’ illustrates his definition of Statement with the expression ‘the hammer is too heavy’, as his example, and in characterizing the first signification of Statement he writes: “In the statement ‘the hammer is too heavy’ what is discovered for sight is not a ‘meaning’ but an entity in the way that it is ready to hand”\(^\text{123}\). If the CWM holds that the primary kind of intentionality is characterized by intending the ready to hand, and that dimming down relations in the positing of a subject by a Statement ought to disrupt this kind of intentionality, then the CWM has something seriously wrong (as far as an interpretation of Heidegger goes) given that Heidegger’s example here is of a kind of positing of a subject by a Statement that nevertheless intends the ready to hand and thus doesn’t disrupt this kind of intentionality. Furthermore, it makes phenomenological sense that dimming down is not the same as severance given that the relations between beings, however dimmed, remain very much un-interfered with in ordinary statements: If I say, ‘the glass is dirty’ and you know what I mean is for you to not drink from it, the glass is not an object of interest in isolation from what you were about to do, nor did I posit the glass that way. ‘Dirty’, here, means something with respect to the way the glass and ‘dirtiness’ figures in the nexus of referential relations: If the condition for something being a property predicated is that it is isolated from that nexus, then as far as ‘dirty’ here goes, a property it is not. More on this in the next section.

My reason for bringing up what I have gathered from Heidegger’s characterization of Statement, is that I want to distinguish the hermeneutic and the apophantic (or the pre-predicative and the predicative), from a certain sense in which one might distinguish the primary and the derivative. When Heidegger discusses the three significations of Statement (the apophantic, the predicative, and the

\(^{123}\) BT p. 144/154 (translation modified).
communicative) he wants to secure the right with which we can say that the Statement is a mode of Interpretation. We can do so because the Statement contains within itself the fore-structures of Interpretation; fore-sight, fore-having, and fore-conception. Yet it is only after having secured this that Heidegger turns to ask: “How does it become derivative?” And here there is an ambiguity which has yet to my knowledge been properly emphasized (neither Golob or the CWM seem to acknowledge the alternative). The standard way to read the question: “How does it become derivative?” is as ‘Why is the Statement derivative?’ The alternative I suggest is: ‘When is the Statement derivative?’ The latter can be paraphrased: ‘How does the derivatory character arise in the Statement?’ This is important because what is influential about the ‘influential passage’ as Schear lays it out, has to do with the extent to which the Statement as derivative links conceptuality, as such, with the present at hand.

The Derivatory character of the Statement

It is true that Heidegger frequently writes as if Statements are derivative. But in doing so he usually qualifies ‘Statement’ by indicating that what he has in mind is what I have called propositions. He opens §33 with: “Since the statement (the ‘‘judgment’’\(^\text{124}\)) is based on understanding and represents a derivative form of Interpretation…”\(^\text{125}\) Notice the square quotes, which in Heidegger’s case are inverted. Further on he connects “‘judgment’” with a theory oriented towards validity (BT: 145/155), which for him implies a present at hand character. The qualification repeats itself in §34 when he writes “An extreme derivative of the interpretation was made visible with the statement.”\(^\text{126}\) This extreme derivative seems unlikely to refer to just any statement given that Heidegger, if we recall, referred to a whole host of intermediary steps between intending the ready to hand and present at hand. Also, if Heidegger by derivative merely means not pre-predicative, that is OK for my purposes. The same goes for derivative as indicating that Statement is still a mode of Interpretation. But at one point, Heidegger straightforwardly

\(^{124}\) «das Urteil»
\(^{125}\) BT p. 144/154
\(^{126}\) BT p.150/160 (my emphasis)
links the derivatory character of Statements with what he calls undergoing a ‘modification’: “But how does the statement become a derivatively mode of interpretation? What has been modified in it?” 127. The modification is what is responsible for the change-over and the leveling, so if Statement is derivative in this sense, then, pace the above, it strengthens Carman’s conception. 128

Heidegger proceeds to answer this question by considering a “limiting case” of a statement of logic, which as he claims, always already has understood a thing ‘logically’. He contrasts such a statement, which he calls a theoretical statement, with a circumspective statement. He uses the ‘the hammer is heavy’ as an example of the former, and ‘the hammer is too heavy’ as an example of the latter. The latter means ‘this hammer is too heavy for me, hand me the other hammer’, and he says that it is meaningful as occurring in some already situated significance, like building something with someone. In contrast, he claims, the theoretical statement has without notice taken its “meaning” on a presupposition of a ‘thing’ and a ‘property’, ‘hammer’ and ‘heaviness’ (BT: 147/157). Part of his point is to insist that the circumspective statement (or the circumspectly spoken interpretation129) cannot be reduced to the theoretical kind due to the circumspective statement being “a specific way of Interpretation”. This, specific way, sounds very much like an extension of Interpretation (as opposed to a modification). The theoretical statement, on the other hand, requires a situated significance to abstract away from (rendering it genetically dependent). So far so good.

The problem begins when Heidegger asks: “Through what existential ontological modification does the statement originate (Entspringt) from circumspect interpretation?”130 ‘The influential passage’ follows this immediately as if to constitute the answer: by ‘leveling’ and ‘change-over’. But if the

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127 BT p. 147/157  
128 Golob does not seem to acknowledge this meaning of derivative when he concedes to the CWM that Statements obviously are derivative (see his 2015). I think this is a slight misstep on his part since he commits himself to a conception where both primary and derivatory mode of Interpretation is an understanding of the same content (they differ only in grammar he says), and the modification is a modification of content (from circumspective to theoretical).  
129 Heidegger does use the term ‘circumspectly spoken interpretation’ (BT: 147/157). It seems implausible to me that he should mean anything else than circumspective Statement because, after all, a circumspectly spoken interpretation such as ‘the hammer is too heavy’ carries with it all three significations of Statement (it points out, predicates and communicates).  
130 ibid.
question it answers is ‘How does the existential ontological modification enable the Statement?’, it rules out the possibility of circumspective statements, for they are precisely such that they could not have undergone a modification in this way.

What I suggest is that we rephrase the question. It is not ‘How does the existential ontological modification enable the Statement?’, but, ‘Through what existential ontological modification does the Statement come out from circumspective Interpretation?’. The point of this rephrasing is that it refers to the existential ontological modification as something which isn’t necessarily, a by which the Statement is to be derived from circumspective Interpretation, springing out from it and away. Prior to the modification the Statement is confined to circumspective Interpretation, as its apophanic extension, and if the existential ontological modification does not occur the Statement remains therein. The reconstrued question lets Statement be something that allows the existential ontological modification of circumspective Interpretation to occur, rather than itself being doomed to effect it. Notice that this question is equal to: ‘How is the existential ontological modification grounded in circumspect Interpretation?’. The way I have construed the question can be defended.

Firstly, the latter question is the one Heidegger in fact goes on to answer. There comes a point in the text where Heidegger seeks to demonstrate that: “Understood as agreement truth has its origin in disclosedness by way of definite modification”. He introduces statements as “communicating beings in the how of their discoveredness”. What he has in mind is a certain way in which statements contain the discoveredness of what they point out, the determination of the beings they share. As entities relating to beings in that way, the statements themselves can be taken up as things ready to hand. But taking up a statement as an entity ready to hand isn’t a comportment toward the statement as such, but towards the being that the statement is about: “[The] statement expressed is something ready to hand, in such a way

\[\text{I use the term apophantic extension because Heidegger writes that “positing the subject, positing the predicate and positing them together are thoroughly ‘apophantic’ in the strict sense of the word.” (BT p. 145/155). The distinction between apophantic and hermeneutic thus mirrors the distinction between the predicative and pre-predicative, but not the distinction between the circumspective and the theoretical, since the apophantic, as I see it, can be circumspective.}\]

\[\text{BT p. 205/224}\]

\[\text{ibid.}\]
that, preserving discoveredness, it has in itself a relation to the beings discovered”.\textsuperscript{134} That seems to make the statement, as something ready to hand, quite particular in that taking up the statement is intending the entities it relates to, as if the statement took over the intention in relating Da-sein to the beings it has already uncovered. It is in this sense someone who has never seen a black caiman, never paddled down an Amazonian river nor made a visit to a Zoo which hosts black caimans, can nevertheless stand in a relationship towards black caimans and their particular traits in hearing about them.\textsuperscript{135} Judgments expressed about black caimans, perhaps originating from those that have actually been in the presence of one, can be taken up by those who have never been intimate with black caimans, so as to intend black caimans themselves.\textsuperscript{136}

From this we see that the judgment contains a relation to an entity, which according to Heidegger is “either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.”\textsuperscript{137} If the relationship between the judgment and the object itself becomes the object of intention – as in logical analysis of the relationship of agreement between a judgment and the world – then, Heidegger says, the relation is no longer one of situated discoveredness but one between two objectively present things:

\begin{quote}
“When the statement has been expressed, the discoveredness of beings moves into the kind of being of innerworldly things ready to hand. But to the extent that in this discoveredness, as a discoveredness of …, a relation to things objectively present persists.”\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

We thus come acquainted with one way in which the Statement allows for a modification to occur. It is due to the statement first containing a relation to something else, an entity, that the relationship itself can become an object of inquiry. At first there is no modification, because, I think, the statement is still

\textsuperscript{134} ibid p. 206/224 (translation modified).
\textsuperscript{135} See especially BT p. 200-201/217-18
\textsuperscript{136} This is extraordinarily useful, but it carries with it the possibility that “discoveredness is appropriated to a large extent not by one’s own discovering, but by hearsay of what has been said.”\textsuperscript{136} Such an understanding is what Heidegger labels inauthentic.
\textsuperscript{137} BT p. 206/224
\textsuperscript{138} BT p.206/127
confined to circumspective seeing in its being about something ready to hand.\textsuperscript{139} The modification occurs when that relationship itself becomes the subject matter. It is a modification precisely because something initially circumspective turns into something present at hand, or as Heidegger says, into the “object” of a Statement. Conceiving the judgment as the locus for the analysis of truth threatens to lead philosophy on a path where nothing but the present at hand is encountered. This, famously, is a move Heidegger is keen to counter by demonstrating the present at hand is grounded in something more original. But though we have skipped ahead, it was exactly this that Heidegger intended §33 to ascertain. The section ends with saying: “[W]e wanted to clarify with this demonstration of the derivation of the statement from interpretation and understanding the fact that the “logic” of logos is rooted in the existential analytic of Da-sein.”\textsuperscript{140} This accords with the way Heidegger opens the section, claiming that the investigation it pursues is warranted due in part to judgment having served as the locus of truth throughout the history of philosophy. He follows this up soon after by complaining that this has led to the ‘theory of judgment’ which has taken ‘validity’ as a primal phenomenon “not to be traced further back”\textsuperscript{141}. Tracing judgments further back, to their conditions of possibility, is exactly the sort of thing we ought to expect from Heidegger and seeing how the Statement is grounded in circumspective Interpretation, and seeing how judgments initially are in the business of circumspectively, not theoretically, interpreting is perfectly in tune with that.

Second, the German word Entspringt, translated as originate in the above, means literally to spring out from.\textsuperscript{142} The point of my construal is that it concerns Statement as it has sprung from circumspect Interpretation by the existential ontological modification of that which it is a statement about; if no such ontological modification is undergone, the Statement lies well within the bounds of circumspective

\textsuperscript{139} Does this mean that intending black caimans only through someone else’s statements about them is initially intending the ready to hand? No. There is another way in which something can become an “object” of a Statement which fits such cases better. I discuss this way in section three.
\textsuperscript{140} ibid p. 150/160
\textsuperscript{141} ibid p. 146/154
\textsuperscript{142} The Macquarrie and Robinson translation captures this better by substituting “originate” with “arise from”.

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Interpreting. The German text highlights better the meaning of the question as I have construed it, and we need not think that Heidegger has been imprecise on this point.

Third, my construal allows for the circumspect spoken interpretation as an extension of circumspect Interpretation in general, which makes sense of Heidegger’s discussion prior to the introduction of the modification.

We have now gained a negative definition of assertion as: *statement that has not undergone the existential ontological modification*. Since it is the existential ontological modification that constitutes the derivatory character, it does not commit me to hold that assertions are derivative in the sense of having undergone the modification, which may go some way in making sense of conceptuality as pre-predicative. Further, it makes the distinction between assertions and propositions have to do with whether the Statement has undergone the existential ontological modification, which seems right to me.

In making room for a conception of conceptuality that doesn’t bind itself to the derivative kind of intentionality associated with the (existential ontological) modification, the question becomes what distinguishes the concept as it figures in the theoretical statement (the proposition) from the concept of the circumspectly spoken interpretation (the assertion). This involves becoming clear about what the change-over and leveling consists in. We have already been treated to a way in which the modification occurs when the relationship between a statement an entity itself is intended, but in §33, Heidegger says that if something is an “object” of a statement, then as soon as we *begin* the statement the change-over has already occurred. This clearly refers to intending some object by stating something. There is still a need to understand the modification with respect to predicatively *intending*, and we must come clear about what that means for conceptuality as such. In the next section I will answer these questions by recourse to Heidegger’s discussion of formal indication.

III

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143 “But how does the Statement become a derivative mode of interpretation? What has been modified in it?”
If we can’t take exception to the thought that concepts necessarily intend the present at hand, we can’t be awake to the idea of a pre-predicative conceptuality. Fortunately, since 1920 a distinction between concepts that do intend in such a way and concepts that don’t is operative in Heidegger’s thinking, as can be seen from his notion of formal indication. In his explication of it, distinct ways of what it takes for generalities (concepts) to instantiate is made available to us. Applying the distinction to Heidegger’s discussion of Statement yields a picture of conceptuality that goes well with what I have said so far.

Formal Indication and the Instantiation of Generalities

Golob (2015) and Schear (2007) both criticize the view that Statements necessarily intend the present at hand for entailing a *reductio* whereby the Statements that make up *Being and Time*, a work that largely concerns what isn’t present at hand, couldn’t. Compare it with Dahlstrom’s (1994) observation that Heidegger tackled the possibility of such a self-referential paradox by appealing to concepts as *formal indications* (*Formale Anziege*), a technical term employed in the favor of phenomenology. In what I find to be his most lucid treatment of it, Heidegger writes:

“Indicated” here means that that which is said is of the character of the “formal,” and so is admittedly improper. Yet precisely in this “im-” there resides at the same time a positive reference. The empty content in its sense-structure is at the same time that which provides direction toward the actualization.**144**

“There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is proper, namely; by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly indicated, by following the indication. An exhausting, a drawing out: precisely […] such a one that the more radical and formal is the understanding of what is empty, the richer it becomes, because it leads to the concrete.”**145**

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144 GA 61 p. 26/32-33
145 ibid.
“With respect to an indicational or referential characteristic, the determination “formal” signifies something decisive! Object “emptyly” meant: and yet decisively! Not arbitrarily and without a sound approach, but precisely “emptyly” and determinative of direction: indicative, binding.”

Here, formal indication is introduced as a methodical moment in phenomenological explication. The openness or emptiness belonging to the formal character signifies the negative point of not letting the concept uncover the phenomena such that it pre-judges it. Heidegger is alert to a possibility where the concept is “packed” with meaning such that it speaks for the phenomena indicated rather than letting the phenomena dictate what should be said of it. The indicative character, then, signifies the positive point of letting the concept, being “empty”, become saturated by the phenomena it indicates in the course of the phenomenological investigation it is to help instigate. As such, a character of indeterminacy belongs to the indicative function of a concept whose formal aspect, although vacuous, is not so indefinite as to indicate nothing: The formal indication is thin (formal aspect), though decisive, and precisely therefore thickens (indicative aspect) appropriately to and with that which is decisively pointed at. There is a sense therefore in which it could be said that the indeterminate character of such concepts is central to their powers of determination.

The usefulness of formal indication to phenomenology can be easily discerned here, and a wealth of questions announce themselves in that regard, but I do not presently care for it as a methodical moment. I am interested in what concepts as formal indications can tell us about concepts as such. If concepts are capable of formally indicating, what does that mean for the nature of conceptuality as it concerns the analytic of Being and Time?  

146 Ibid.
147 See Dahlstrom (1994), Streeter (1994), Granberg (2004) and Hatab (2016) for more thorough treatments of formal indications and their role in Heidegger’s project.
148 The connection is warranted. Even though formal indication isn’t explicitly treated in BT (because, I think, BT is mainly a work of, and not about, phenomenology), it’s employment is, as noted by Hatab (2016) mentioned several times throughout the text. Further, although Heidegger’s treatment of formal indication occurs several years prior to BT in the lecture courses of 1921-22 (volume 60 and 61 of the Gesamtausgabe), he continues to employ the term well after its publication, specifically in the summer lecture of 1930 (GA 29)
That concepts can function as formal indications imply that concepts can intend that which isn’t present at hand: “We can only understand the concepts that open up this connection as long as they are not taken to signify characteristic features or properties of something present at hand.”149 What is interesting is how they do not intend this way. In the winter semester of 1920150 Heidegger introduces formal indication by way of contrast with the meaning of “general” as it pertains to generalization; conceiving something by a classificatory act of ordering it in accordance with genus and species, and formalization; conceiving something by the fact that it is given at all, or in accordance to the aspect (such as sensory modality) in which it is given. By example, the former has to do with some snake being classified along things that are ‘slithering’, ‘boa constrictors’, ‘scaly’, etc. While classification confines itself to the material domain of things, the formal has to do with the snake being given at all, permitting essentialist ascriptions such that it could be said to have ‘greenness’ or ‘objecthood’. Formalization and generalization, hence, is a matter of ordering things in categories among which inferential relations are drawn (if something is a ‘snake’, then, as one may come to know, it is ‘cold-blooded’, ‘sensitive to proximal surface vibrations’ ‘extended’, etc.). If concepts hope to intend the ready to hand then, they cannot confine themselves to the general in this way.

Recall the connection between the leveling and the present at hand. We get a glimpse of how Heidegger imagines leveling to occur with respect to the above. He says that generalization is a “materially immanent order of stages of determinatenesses, which stand among each other in the relation of mutual concernability, so that the most general determination refers all the way to the very last, most subordinate.”151 He emphasizes its materiality because there is no classification if there isn’t a class that could be written out in sounds and symbols as a point of mutual attention. What is interesting here is the ascription of immanence to the materiality, the point of which is this:

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149 GA 29/39 p. 296 (emphasis in original)
150 Published as GA 58
151 Ga 60 p. 42
“Generalizing determinations are always determinations of an object according to its materiality from another viewpoint, and indeed such that what determines, for its part, itself belongs within the material domain in which the determining ‘what’ lies. Generalization is thus ordering; it is determination from another, such that this other belongs, as encompassing, to the same material region as that to be determined. Generalization is thus an integration into the material complex of another”

Heidegger speaks of a movement from one domain to another. There is the natural way of things, the material domain, which can be intended by generalizing such that the generalization itself integrates with the material domain. In that sense, the determination – the generalization – and the determined are on a level. They are materially aligned. I take this to mean that not only would intending something by generalization be intending something ordered, and hence, general. But intending the generalization would itself be intending the way of things: Determining the snake by means of a classificatory concept is determining it in a set of ordered relationships, such that, intending the domain of ordering itself is intending the natural way of things it encompasses. That is tantamount to saying that intending snakes, in general, can be achieved by intending the concept of ‘snake’ as it is ordered in the domain. The two material domains are now on a level. Hence the immanence.

The above point is a tricky one, and Heidegger stops short of satisfying clarification. What is clear is that the Heidegger of 1920 would think that determining the snake by means of a classificatory concept ‘snake’ is determining the snake as standing in a set of ordered relationships that pertains to snakes (in general that is), that intending by such general ascriptions amounts to intending the present at hand, and that concepts, viz, formal indications do not do this. Rather, they get their meaning from the “concrete”.

The great advantage of generalities is that they instantiate across space and time notwithstanding distance. Without them it would be seemingly impossible for any one thing, including one’s past and futures selves, to be consciously intended in its absence, and, unless (somehow) one had a name for all things in even their tiniest variations, in their presence as well. Concepts must remain general in some sense. This is what I take the formal aspect to secure, in its “Object, emptily, meant: and yet decisively”.

152 ibid.
A generality (similarity) instantiating each time differently. With that in mind, and looking beyond the methodical moment towards concepts as what allows for both formal indications and determination by generalization, I suggest we derive from the Heidegger of the 1920’s a bifurcated view of conceptual determination that turns on a difference in what it takes for a generality to instantiate: In one case letting the generality take precedence such that the determination is a matter of ordering the object intended in accordance with a domain clarified in the absence of any one instance. (The concept instantiates such that the object becomes a generality and is present at hand.) In the other case letting the particular take precedence such that the determination is a matter of letting that which is decisively intended contribute to the meaning of the concept. (The concept instantiates such that the concept becomes saturated with the object which remains ready to hand).

The cases are inverse. In the first case the concept instantiates by bringing the particular downstream from experience to the domain of generalizations. In the second case it itself travels upstream to instantiate in the experience of things. Accordingly, the former type of concept has general content, the latter has particular content. The former is a condition for something like science and logic, as it allows us to say that it is true or false whether objects fall under such and such concepts, rendering the objects suitable as the ‘about which’ of empirical or logical propositions. The latter is a condition for phenomenology, in that it renders the concepts employed by phenomenology, open, to be gradually saturated by the phenomena uncovered by phenomenological description. As Granberg (2004) puts it “it is the philosophizing individual who is left the task of actualizing the concept and its content.” Since such an actualization isn’t of the kind of content that belongs to a generalization, but one that requires immersion in an experiential situation, the referential paradox is dispelled.

The connection between formal indication and Being and Time is thus an important one, having led Ryan Streeter to conclude that “Being and Time is an empty book”, and Lawrence Hatab to comment that “It was only after I learned about formal indication that Being and Time opened up to me in a

153 Granberg 2004 p. 19
154 Streeter 1994 p. 426
Returning to 1927, we see the locus of conceptual determination shift from the concept to the Statement. Nevertheless, something like the bifurcation remains intact, and I will develop it in accordance with answering the remaining questions I outlined at the end of section one.

*The Change-over and the Leveling*

‘The influential passage’ tells us that if an entity becomes the “object” of a Statement, then when we begin this Statement a change-over in the fore-having has occurred. Recall that the fore-having initially refers to a totality of referential relationships of relevance that make up the world we encounter entities in terms of. Recall also that language, among other things, harbors already expressed judgments that can be meaningfully taken over given that discoveredness of beings are preserved in them. Bringing this together we are treated to a way in which we can understand the fore-having, post change-over, as the totality of reference between things as they have already been uncovered by judgments predicating properties of them: A propositionally uncovered world had in advance.

I suggest that we connect this notion of having in advance what has already been propositionally uncovered with what it takes for objects to fall under concepts in the sense where the general takes precedence. We then get a picture where the fore-had world, or totality of significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*), is constituted by referential relationships between entities as they figure in *ordered* propositions, *as* instancing generalities. This makes sense, for Heidegger says of the Statement that “it needs a fore-having of something disclosed in general which it points out in the mode of determining.”\(^{156}\) If the mode of determining is conceiving something in terms of a general property that the thing instantiates, an example we saw Heidegger himself give as a ‘limiting case’ of logic, then the fore-had referential totality should be structured by and between such properties. That mimics the immanence of the above, except that now we don’t get the sense that it lies before us like a field made of the combined materiality of the

\(^{155}\) Hatab 2016 p. 13

\(^{156}\) BT p. 146/157
general and the way of things. Rather, in the analytic of *Being and Times* it becomes a *transcendental* matter of how entities are disclosed: on the basis of a referential nexus whose relations stand between ordered properties. Since these pertain to generalizations, encountering beings on this basis (*Being and Time* sometimes speaks of entities being projected upon the referential totality i.e. p. 141/151) is to encounter them as general, as made intelligible on a framework of generalization.

In the above case a hammer would be encountered as significant on a background of whatever relevant properties it is thought to instantiate and the ways these relate to others. So, for instance, ‘heaviness’, ‘manufactured’, ‘metallic’, etc., are properties it would instantiate and share with other entities, and other hammers, while ‘fluorescent’, ‘sugary’ and ‘liquid’ are properties it wouldn’t. Post change-over it is these which sets beings meaningfully apart from and in relation to other beings.\(^{157}\) Their “object” significance would consist in occupying the intersection of whichever properties they instantiate. It is therefore, as Heidegger says, that the logical analysis has already presupposed the meaning of the sentence ‘the hammer is heavy’, as: “this thing, the hammer, has the property of heaviness”\(^ {158}\). Compare its meaning when employed as an assertion: ‘the hammer is too heavy’ whereby ‘heavy’ means: hand me the other hammer”.

The point is *not* to say that the indefinite number of generalizations instantiated by the hammer is what determines it. Rather, it is that if the hammer becomes the “object” of a Statement, of a proposition, its becomes significant on the background of a previously propositionally ordered set of relations. What I have proposed so far is a way to understand the objecthood of the “object” as related to a general *order* of things, relationships between beings as they are propositionally uncovered. Since concepts (a generality) makes for generalizations, then in so far as judgments employs concepts to that end, we have one way in which the Statement allows for the present at hand. That takes care of the change-over.

What about leveling? First, it is a condition for the formal indication that this does not occur. An assertion, as already said, is a Statement in which levelling doesn’t occur. Thus, I suggest we model

\(^{157}\) Consider also the case of measurement where things are distinguished by instantiating the same property to different degrees.

\(^{158}\) *BT* p. 147/157
assertions on the second type of conceptual determination, whereby the particular which is decisively intended by the concept contribute to its meaning. An assertion, then, is a Statement that determines such that it predicates in a manner which allows the particular circumstance, perspective, and the beings encountered to get a say in what is said thereby. In that case, the ‘about which’ of the assertion is determined in its particularity under some aspect in which it shows itself. In the example of the hammer being too heavy, the hammer which is the ‘about which’ of that assertion comes to signify another hammer which shows itself as relevant with respect to a project for another person; it becomes determined in accordance with an in-order-to be handed over, such that it maintains its role in the totality of involvements. This agrees with the emptiness of the predication. The emptiness refers to the reaching out into “the totality of involvements”, letting the entity be determined in its relation to some ongoing project of Da-sein, other entities, and other Da-sein in their ongoing activities. These are the relations the entity, already, prior to becoming the about-which of a Statement, is significant on the base of.

Contrast the above with the predicate that aims at a property in the subject matter, and consequently fixates the entity in an ordered set of relations between properties alone. Heidegger links the ‘existential ontological modification’ to the ‘as’ structure of Interpretation, writing that: “The ‘as’ no longer reaches into a totality of relevance”\(^{159}\), by which he means that it is cut off from, no longer able to articulate, “the referential relations of significance which constitute the character of the surrounding world”\(^{160}\). The modified ‘as’ articulates only the referential relations between an ordered set of properties or propositions which correspond to the general character of beings which remain divorced from the totality of involvements. What I propose is that these referential relations between what is general is what corresponds to, in Heidegger’s words, the “uniform level of what is objectively present.”\(^{161}\) The change-over and the leveling, then, are two sides of a coin, the first corresponding to the basis on which something is intelligible, the second to what can be intelligibly articulated on such a basis: objective presence.

\(^{159}\) BT p. 148/158
\(^{160}\) ibid.
\(^{161}\) ibid.
Assertion and Proposition

I defined assertion as: a statement that has not undergone the existential ontological modification, which, in line with the above implies that the empty reach into the totality of involvements is maintained. The definition remains negative to indicate that something must happen before the Statement yields a proposition, as for the most part, Statements assert. Schear (2007) has demonstrated the unlikelihood that this something is just the act of stating itself, and I have sought to add to that by suggesting an alternative reading of §33. But what I have said so far still leaves open precisely how something becomes an “object” of a Statement, which is what allows the modification to occur.

Golob (2014; 2015) has an interesting suggestion. Intending an entity by means of a statement is not sufficient for intending the present-at-hand (of which he thinks there are three types), more is needed:

“If an entity $E$ is intended by a propositional mode of intentionality $I$ and $I$ is subject to a certain method of philosophical analysis $M$ then $E$ is intended as either present-at-hand1, or present-at-hand2, or present-at-hand3 or some combination of these.”

Golob thinks ‘the influential passage’ doesn’t consider Statements as such, but Statements as they have undergone logical analysis, a specific version of ‘$M$’. He defines $M$ as:

“[A]ny programme for investigating propositional intentionality which is not fully committed to [...] The methodological principle that the primary philosophical analysis of propositional intentionality should take the form of an analysis of Dasein.”

Golob’s claim is that Statements intend the present-at-hand if – and only if? – some analysis of propositional intentionality is first subjected to it. If the bi-conditional is in place it is a strong claim. Too strong, I think.

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162 Golob (2015) p. 897
I agree with Golob that Heidegger thinks analyzing judgments by means of a method incapable of asking the question of being is intrinsically connected with thinking of beings as present at hand. We have already seen Heidegger write along such lines when objecting that intending the relationship of agreement between statements and the world implies intending the statement as an objectively present thing that relates to another objectively present thing. However, the objection was raised against a specific conception of truth that may follow (as agreement between two things, the judgment, and the object; BT §44). Similarly, §33 does appeal to propositions of logic (a version of M) as a limiting case, but this ties in with aiming to show how the logos comes to be experienced as something objective.\footnote{Heidegger closes the section by saying: “We wanted to clarify with this demonstration of the derivation of the statement from interpretation and understanding the fact that the “logic” of logos is rooted in the existential analytic of Da-sein”, and “The logos is [then] experienced as something objectively present and interpreted as such, and the beings which it points out have the meaning of objective presence as well.” (BT p. 150/160).} I don’t see Heidegger as having demonstrated that something becomes the “object” of a Statement only if the statement itself is subjected to M. I am unsure whether Golob does. He at least thinks Heidegger held it to be a sufficient condition, and that seems right. But M by itself seems too strong to be necessary. It seems like we can intend something as present at hand without subjecting the statement to a methodology.

To illustrate, imagine the case of Chris. Acquainted with the science of color he believes that there is no such thing as a black color, for in being so acquainted he knows that what it is for something to be black is to not reflect the light waves we see as color but absorb them. Accordingly, he thinks that the proposition ‘black is the absence of color’, is true. Eventually, his friend comes around to ask whether his shoes goes well with “this color”, pointing to a black pair of jeans, and Chris, thinking his friend has made some kind of mistake, objects to the question on the grounds that black strictly speaking isn’t a color. In this case Chris wouldn’t be intending black as that kind of thing which goes badly with a certain shade of green or is customary to wear at funerals. That is, he would not be intending black in a way which reaches into the totality of involvements within which it belongs originally as a color term. Rather, he would be intending it as something that has the property of not reflecting light waves, something to be contrasted with things that do emit light waves, such as colors. But though ‘black is not a color’ is, in
this case\textsuperscript{164}, a proposition judging something as present at hand, Chris certainly did not apply some methodology for analyzing statements.

On account of such cases, I propose to do away with $M$ while retaining its spirit. It is not intending the judgment by subjecting it to some method, but intending the judgment full stop, that instigates the modification. As is the case with $M$, intending the statement is intending something as the “object” of a statement. This is due to the statement carrying with it the object in its manner of being uncovered. Chris did not apply any method to the analysis of the statement ‘black is not a color’. Rather, he intended ‘black’ as it had been uncovered ‘not a color’, by thinking of, or recalling that statement itself as expressing a true judgement of it. Intending a statement is equal to intending an entity as uncovered, as judged to be in some way, as an “object” of that statement which expresses the judgment. What Chris did was to intend ‘black’ as the object of the statement ‘black is not a color’. The present at hand is the specialty of the statement, for in explicitly determining the entity ‘as’, the statement can itself become an entity to be intended \textit{while} relating to, or signifying, the entity as it has itself judged it to be. To put the point conversely, this also goes for intending an entity in a manner such that it relates \textit{solely} to some statement (itself an entity) which has judged it to be the way it is. Put either way, the statement takes \textit{precedence} over what is the case, say, that the black jeans went badly with the shoes. Originally, colors are those things that can go badly with each other. But that is not how the statement ‘black is not a color’ has things, and in the example, Chris is only awake to the truthfulness of that. This ties in with the distinct types of instantiation discussed above. The question was whether the shoes went well with ‘this color’ of jeans. On one hand ‘black’ (this color) is instantiated as that kind of thing that makes the jeans fit

\textsuperscript{164} There is an additional question here as to whether scientific statements are necessarily present at hand. A reason to think that they don’t have to do with the extent to which it is appropriate to construe science as a practice, and the scientific world as itself constituted by a totality of involvements for scientists to reach in to. The present example stays clear of this because Chris himself is not a color scientist, and unlike when color scientists, being such, say things like ‘strictly speaking black is not a color’, Chris is not currently immersed within the established practice of uncovering the wave-lengths of color terms or vice versa, and does not intend black as ready at hand even in that sense. For some back and forth that touches upon this see Rouse 2008; Kochan 2011; de Bruyckere and Van Dyck 2013
badly with a certain shade of green shoes (one could for instance say that the jeans don’t fit because they are black). On the other ‘black’ is instantiated such that those jeans are judged to have the property of being colorless, and so that one is mistaken to imply that they are colored.

To intend an entity as it is judged to be in its being an “object” of a statement is not to intend an entity merely by judging. It is important to me that do not not confuse intending a statement with intending by stating. Intending by a stating, as we saw earlier, can be a case of taking over the statement to intend something as uncovered by something previously stated. But this remains a case of judging the entity to be how it is usually said to be. Taking over a statement does not make the statement itself an entity intended. This sort of taking over Heidegger calls inauthentic understanding, to be contrasted with drawing one’s understanding, and the appropriate words, from the way the entity shows itself to be. What is of importance to the present discussion is that this sort of inauthentic understanding reaches into the totality of referential relationships, and so is not a case of present at hand intentionality. Taking over statements, in this inauthentic sense, is still to intend beings themselves as they are said to be, and not beings as “objects” of statements. Conversely, to intend something as an “object” of a Statement is to intend it as something some statement is about. To do that one has to intend what a statement is about as the about which of some statement. In contrast, to intend something by a statement, one case of which can be taking over a statement, one must intend something in a particular way, namely, as it is said to be by the statement. If one takes over a statement, that statement is still about what it is about, but one does not intend what it is about as that which some statement is about, one just intends it in accordance with the statement. There is a phenomenological difference here. To intend something as the “object” of a sentence is to intend somethings solely in terms of that sentence as opposed to the circumstance. That was what Chris did when he intended ‘black’. If Chris had taken over the statement “black is not a color” rather than intended it in and of itself, he might have said the same thing with different intent, jokingly poking fun at his friend rather than attempting to correct him, thus allowing the circumstances (in which ‘black’ is treated as a color term) to play its part in contributing to the meaning of what was said.
I have suggested that intending something as an “object” of a statement, intending a statement in and of itself, over and above a being, will constitute intending the present at hand. I do not claim that this is a necessary condition. Heidegger also suggests that one could intend something as present at hand simply by staring at it, or by experiencing a breakdown in equipment, together with a range of other things (see Schear 2007 for a host of candidates) What I am claiming is that intending something as an “object” of a statement, intending a statement in and of itself, is a sufficient condition, and that it accounts for the present at hand being the specialty of the Statement.

Heidegger ties the present at hand in the case of the Statement (though I think in all cases) to the severance of referential relationships between beings that constitutes circumspective seeing, and that is exactly what intending a statement achieves. The only relation the statement in and of itself maintains is between the subject and the predicate, so if nothing other than the predicate, no further agent relative context, weighs in on the determination, there is nothing of what is particular that does. That makes for, as we have seen, understanding the entity in terms of features which generalize (irrespective of context). Since these features are what determine the entity, what we are intending when intending something as an “object” of a statement, is a generalization. Since that is, in the present picture, what it means for something to be an “object” of a statement, I propose that we can define proposition as a: *statement that intends an entity by generalization*. The definition, of course, is to be understood within the framework of *Being and Time*, where a contrast is implied with the ‘as’ which reaches into a totality of involvements. The point of the definition is that a statement that intends an entity by generalization intends something general. Note therefore that intending what is general will suffice for intending the present at hand. Such would be the case if one intended *black caimans* (in general) by hearsay. In these cases, even if one intends black caimans by taking over a statement about black caimans, one judges something general, and since that judgment doesn’t instantiate in some particular experience it doesn’t count as an assertion as I have explicated it.
The range of intermediary cases.

An interesting benefit that arises with distinguishing between assertion and proposition as I have proposed, is that the range of intermediary cases which Heidegger takes to exist between statements that intend the ready to hand and statements that intend the present at hand can be made intelligible. Heidegger writes that circumspection has its own specific ways of interpretation that contrasts with theoretical judgments, and “may take some such form as ‘the hammer is too heavy’, or even better, ‘too heavy, the other hammer’.” Or even better: ‘Too heavy’ (one might say this to someone with whom one is well acquainted and what is meant is understood anyway). Consider moving from (h1) ‘too heavy’ to (h2) ‘too heavy, the other hammer’, to (h3) ‘the hammer is too heavy’ to (h4) ‘the hammer is heavy’ to (h5) ‘the hammer weighs 2.3kg’. Notice that we have moved from a statement (h1) that requires circumstantial knowledge to comprehend, through (h2) which gets us to imagine a circumstance, and (h3) which gets us to imagine a speaker or thinker, to (h4) which is ambiguous with respect to whether it is a sentence uttered by someone or an example in an introductory course on predicate-calculus, and (h5) which seems to express a fact or falsehood, making the statement intelligible in terms of its having a truth value, hence being context independent. Moving through these different statements seems, at least, to constitute an intermediary range going from intending the ready to hand to the present at hand. The difference in degree turns on the extent to which we can take the statement itself, over and above the context as expressing something meaningful. The most extreme case is the case where taking the cue from the statement itself trumps the context, as we saw happen with Chris.

Notice that on my reading we don’t need to take (h5) to intend the present at hand if we can find some circumspective sense in which it can be uttered. Christian measures the floor of his apartment in order to ascertain that it can accommodate a particularly tasteful carpet. To this there corresponds the statement: ‘The floor is 34 m^2’ (Christian may say this to himself). For sure, the floor is determined in

\[165\] BT p.157/157
\[166\] In the sense in which this is to express a judgment, and not intend one.
terms of one of its properties, and the statement reflects this, and so we may be nudged to believe that when Christian intends the floor in terms of this measurement, and the corresponding statement, he is intending it as present at hand. However, the practice of measurement here is situated within the project of decorating the house. The being of the floor isn’t determined solely by its being 34 m² as if that’s that as far as the significance of 34 m² goes. Rather m² means something for Christian; judging the carpet to be 34 m² means that the floor can accommodate the carpet he desires. That is what the measurement, and the statement, signifies in the situated case. For the floor to have been individuated in terms of the measurement of its properties alone, with the corresponding statement, on the other hand; would be a case of intending it as present-at-hand. But of course, the locution ‘alone’ refers to its having been severed from a contextual relation.\textsuperscript{167}

If Christian doesn’t keep his project going and just stops with the statement, the statement itself will seem to drive towards a present at hand being: The floor as it belongs to the extension of things 34 m². The floor, then, shows itself only in accordance with the Statement as it corresponds to the measurement. I suggest that the series of intermediary steps has to do with the extent, increasing with (h1) to (h5), to which what is stated itself suggests, or compel, us to stop with it, ignore the context, and consider something as its “object”. If this account is a correct interpretation, and Statements, when considered by themselves in isolation from context, intends the present at hand, it is a small wonder that Heidegger calls the present at hand “the specialty of the Statement”\textsuperscript{168}. Since this account, with the same stroke, makes it so that we needn’t consider the Statement this way, the present at hand remains a specialty only, and not its usual business.

\textsuperscript{167} That is not to say, or at least I am looking to say, that intending present at hand hasn’t been a necessary step in the process at some point for Christian. He may for instance at some point have compared the floor and the carpet by means of their respective properties alone. To this there belongs a question whether the act of measurement itself, or the act of comparing two things by means of their properties, is intending something present at hand even if these acts of measuring are situated within some established practice of measuring things for-the-sake of, say, accommodation.

\textsuperscript{168} BT p. 141/151
IV

I began with stating my belief that the Heidegger of *Being and Time* is a conceptualist. That seems to be the best fit with what is written when Interpretation is said to be grounded in fore-conception, and always setting upon a definite conceptuality. Given that Interpretation has to do with understanding things as so and such (hermeneutically seeing/determining ‘as’) it seems to imply that Interpretation necessarily draws on our conceptual capacities in so doing. I don’t claim anything on behalf of Heidegger or conceptualism beyond that. Good phenomenology is about letting us see what is there to be seen. What is there for us to see is the conceptual grasp we enjoy of the beings we encounter in circumspection. Heidegger is scarce about what this means, but that anyway is the invitation. I have myself refrained from giving some positive account of whatever else it might entail. My argumentative tactic has been to remove a chief reason to think this cannot be the case: If circumspection deals with the ready to hand, and concepts can get at the ready to hand, nothing related stops us from thinking that circumspective seeing is in some sense conceptual.

Heidegger’s treatment of conceptuality in *Being and Time* occurs in his discussion of the apophantic which is derivative upon Interpretation and has the present at hand as its specialty. That explains the orthodoxy of the CWM. If I am right neither the derivative nor the specialty does anything to make the apophantic ‘as’ pertain to the present at hand. In fact, if I am right, most statements are assertions as I have distinguished them from propositions. Since assertions intend the ready to hand by reaching into the totality of involvements and are therefore situated within circumspective seeing, not to be seen in contradistinction from it, they make available a conception of concepts that crashes with that of that of the CWM. My proposal simultaneously explains Heidegger’s repeated allusions occurring throughout *Being and Time* to statements intending the ready to hand (not to mention *Being and Time* the text) and doesn’t require us to explain away fore-conception or the definite conceptuality.

If we recall Carman’s conceptions, they went: (c1) ‘Knowing how’ predates and conditions ‘knowing that’; (c2) ‘Knowing that’ is topic of a propositional kind of intentionality; (c3) Propositional
content is biconditionally bound up with conceptuality as such. I claimed that (c3) was false, the reasons for which I have just rehearsed: Concepts, as they figure in assertions are not bound to present at hand content. I also said that this makes (c2) unstable. It is true that ‘knowing that’ is the topic of propositional intentionality, but (c2) fails to distinguish between assertions and propositions. Assertions, after all, are claims about the world: ‘those shoes go well with those jeans’, ‘the hammer is too heavy’. They state that things are so and such. Assertions, as well as propositions, apophantically uncovers entities by dimming down and focusing upon them, seeing them as so and such in terms of their self-showing. This is what it would mean within a Heideggerian framework to know ‘that’. Knowing that is a topic of a propositional kind of intentionality, but in so far as this means intending by judging, the “that” can be both an “object” of a statement (intended ontologically de dicto; proposition), and the ‘about which’ of a circumspectively spoken interpretation (intended ontologically de re; assertion).

As for (c1) it seems right to say that Interpretation has to do with ‘knowing how’. Interpretation explicitly understands something as something with regard to its in-order-to, which situates it in reference to the practical engagement of Da-sein (BT: 159/149). That means that the ‘as’ involves the articulation of something in terms of the achievement of some future end to which it serves a functional purpose. But (c1) is misleading because it is with respect to this articulation that Interpretation has conceptual work cut out for it. Carman seems to want to construe the relation between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ on the relation between pre-predicative and predicative seeing, where the latter, as we have seen, is bound to the former, but ‘knowing that’, articulating conceptually, need not be tied to predication. If one would like to emphasize the pragmatic element still, we could call this ‘conceptual knowing how’. Yet, unless one has further reasons to think that knowing must be a matter of stating, it seems better to say that ‘knowing that’ is a matter of ‘knowing how’ or vice versa. What is suggested when it is said that Interpretation presupposes a fore-conception and always settles upon a determinate conceptuality is that conceptuality is central to its work. Central how? I read Heidegger such that “fore-conception” refers to the conceptual knowledge/domain/mastery Da-sein enjoys prior to some circumstance from which Interpretation draws in coming clear about the beings as they figure in that circumstance. I read the
“definite conceptuality” upon which Interpretation settles as that portion of the conceptual knowledge/domain/mastery that answers to things being as they are in having been determined as so and such; that conceptuality to which the as something of the “something as something” of the entities determined in Interpretation is related. If that is right, it means that the entities are determined, or individuated, in a way that relates them to the definite concepts settled upon in the Interpretation (“always”). Nothing further is said about the specifics of this relationship or the nature of the conceptuality at play. Heidegger’s point answers only a transcendental question: How are things determined ‘as’?

*Being and Time* thus leaves us with a question: How are we to understand the conceptuality related to the entities determined in Interpretation? Heidegger writes that “the ready to hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself a theme for circumspection.”¹⁶⁹ His point is that we are not really concerned with the equipment’s themselves, who are most useful to us when they withdraw entirely from sight, but what they help us do. Whatever the fore-conception and definite conceptuality answer to it should be something that accords with the world as it is structured by our practical understanding. Part of the point of this essay has been to release the question from the CWM which would not let it be raised. But I do not have a full-fledged answer.¹⁷⁰ In the first essay I recommended reading * Rede* in relation to a way in which the world and the beings therein is disclosed: as suitable to figure as the content of our linguistic expressions. If I was right about that, perhaps we could think of fore-conception as, doing some work in that regard, as, among other things, preparing beings for what is to be said of them. I cannot pursue this there, but it bears notice in this regard that pre-predicative seeing predates and conditions predicative seeing in a way that could strengthen my case against Carman’s conceptions. Recall Heidegger speaking about the predicate “in its inexplicit enclosure in beings themselves”. The Statement required a fore-sight in which the predicate could be “so to speak” loosened. The idea seems to be that judgment makes explicit something about the being which is already seen to be there inexplicitly in it.

¹⁶⁹ BT p. 65/69  
¹⁷⁰ One suggestion can be found in chapter three of Golob’s *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom Normativity* (2014), though as I said, I am not convinced of it.
The wording is not one urge us to towards understanding concepts as conjured up at a distance from the entities uncovered in Interpretation, as would be the case if the contents of ‘knowing that’ would be distinct from the contents of ‘knowing how’. Rather, the proposition is that concepts are already inexplicitly there, somehow, in entities, even before they become the conceptually delineated ‘about which’ of a judgment. This is a strange proposition to come to grips with, but minimally it seems to suggest that the entity has been conceptually worked out prior to becoming the ‘about which’, which is to the point of saying that Interpretation draws on conceptual capacities necessarily. It implies that we always have concepts available for what we deal with and what we do, though it doesn’t mean that these need to be very well developed. I doubt there is anyone that can articulate perfectly what they do all the time, but everyone can say something, even if it doesn’t fit very well.

An objection would be available to the non-conceptualist reader if it could be ascertained (and Heidegger does not help us here) that the inexplicitly enclosed predicate arrives only when the Statement takes a step back to “posit the subject”. If so the inexplicit enclosure belongs to the predicative and could not tell us anything interesting about the pre-predicative. Opting for that solution does come with some awkward consequences however. It means that the inexplicit predicate first manifests itself with the stepping back, which makes of it a moment in the determining procedure. That reads as if predicative seeing first inserts something into beings and then “loosen” and pick it out, which sounds weird by itself, but doesn’t sit well with the phenomenology either. Think of the flowing transition between speaking about things and acting on them. It hardly seems to include a part where the speaking prepares the beings to be spoken of. Nothing seems to be loaded on to things when we predicate. Our words are just immediately responsive to the things they concern. I smile cheerfully and say ‘red and tasty’, as I eat the fruit: The red doesn’t seem to be far away from the apple, even as I go about chewing.

As far as arguments go we cannot get any further then pointing to what in fact is written in §32. Nor need we. The non-conceptualist reader cannot let that speak for itself and emphasizes the section on Statement instead. But a non-conceptual reading of that section, such as the CWM’s, fails to acknowledge that statements can intend the ready to hand. I tried to show what it would take for Statements to yield
both assertions and propositions, and I made that take consistent with what Heidegger says about the change-over and the leveling and what it takes for statements to be derivative. If all that was convincing, the CWM, as an interpretation of *Being and Time* should not be to anyone’s preference. Discarding the CWM allows us to get back to what is written in §32. If we take our lead from that section, as I have done, a set of conceptions different to Carman’s are made available: (*c1.*) Pre-predicative seeing is, in some sense, necessarily conceptual. (*c2.*) Predicative intentionality can either aim at the ready to hand or the present at hand depending respectively on whether we intend by a statement or intend the statement itself. (*c3.*) Conceptuality is conditionally bound to both the ready to hand and the present at hand. These conceptions seem to me to fit better with *Being and Time*. 
References


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